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CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS FOR RAIL-TRAIL
CONVERSIONS: RECONCILING THE PARTIAL INTEREST




This Article examines an undeveloped legal topic at the intersection
of tax law and real property law: charitable deductions from income tax
liability for donations of railroad corridors that are to be converted into
recreational trails. The very popular rails-to-trails program assists in the
conversion of abandoned railroad corridors into hiking and biking trails.
However, the legal questions surrounding the property rights of these cor-
ridors have been complex and highly litigated. In 1983, Congress amended
the National Trails System Act to provide a mechanism for facilitating
these conversions, a process called railbanking. In essence, a railroad
transfers its real property interests in its corridor to a trail sponsor for
interim trail use and retains a right to re-enter in the event that rail ser-
vice needs to be reactivated on the line. Thus, the dual purposes of the
statute-interim trail use and rail preservation-are furthered by a pro-
cess that prevents the corridor from being broken up and irrevocably lost.
An important element of railbanking and trail conversion is the
prospect for the railroads of a deduction from their income tax liability
when they donate these corridors for public trail use. Recently, however,
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has begun to question the donations
by invoking the so-called "partial interest rule." Should the IRS prevail
in applying this rule, the deduction would be entirely disallowed under
current Internal Revenue Code provisions.
This Article discusses the interaction of these two areas of law and
proposes ways the railroads can draft their trail use agreements to mini-
mize the likelihood of being challenged by the IRS, and ways the IRS, the
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Surface Transportation Board, Congress, and the railroads can work
together to reconcile the conflict in these different laws. In the end, we
believe that the rail preservation function is critical to the public welfare
and that it is in everyone's best interest to further railbanking and interim
trail use. However, doing so requires careful drafting and perhaps regu-
latory changes to ensure that railroads do not unfairly take advantage
of the tax system, while at the same time maintaining an incentive for
railroads to railbank and offer their corridors for future public use.
INTRODUCTION
Rail-trail conversions have become an increasingly popular way
to recycle dormant rail corridors, as public recreational use of the corridors
for activities such as hiking and biking has become widespread.' Aside
from avoiding the potential tort liability associated with vacant rail cor-
ridors, a major incentive for railroads to convert the corridors into publicly
used trails is the possibility of a large charitable deduction from federal
income tax that may result from the conversion. The requirements of the
federal railbanking statutes, coupled with the complexity of the Internal
Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") provisions on charitable deductions, however,
has presented a serious obstacle for railroads that want to claim the
deduction. In order to convert the corridor to a trail through the federal
railbanking program, a railroad must retain a right to re-enter in case
national transportation needs demand reactivation of rail services.2 That
right to re-enter, which is a future interest sliced out of the railroad's prop-
erty interests in its corridor land,' means that the property interests the
railroad transfers to a trail group are less than the totality of property
1 See, e.g., Michael Rowe, Rails and Trails: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,
AMERICANTRAiLs.ORG, Dec. 2000, http://www.americantrails.org/resources/railtrails/
RailsAndTrailsMike.html ("As of March, 1992, there are already some 5,000 miles of
rail-trails . . ").
2 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(3) (2007).
' There is disagreement over the nature of this property right, and whether it is even a
property right at all. It could be a contractual right or a regulatory right, and no court
has weighed in on the matter. If it is not a property right at all, the issues raised in this
article are moot, though, for the reasons expressed below, we think that is a narrow way
to view this interest. Moreover, to the extent courts determine it to be a property right,
the conflicts between trail groups and railroads, which might arise in only a small
number of cases, will force the parties to deal with the partial interest rule. By taking on
that possibility, we hope to anticipate and provide a way to resolve the conflicts that
ultimately protects the interests of all parties. See infra Part IV for further discussion
of this issue.
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it holds. Ironically, retaining this right potentially nullifies a railroad's
claim to a charitable deduction by violating the partial interest rule of
I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A). Without the deduction, the incentive to preserve rail
corridors for future uses may disappear, undermining national transpor-
tation policy and a number of federal statutes designed to promote rail-
trail conversions.
This Article explores the confluence of property and tax law in this
relatively undeveloped area of law. After explaining the legal mechanism
of railbanking and trail conversion, we discuss the tension between the
National Trails System Act ("NTSA") and the I.R.C. We explain the partial
interest rule and address three potential arguments that railroads have
advanced to overcome this obstacle. Only one of these arguments, based
upon the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible doctrine, seems to have any likeli-
hood of success. Further, we evaluate strategies that railroads might use
to increase their likelihood of prevailing in claims for the deductions. In
the end, we propose regulatory and legislative steps towards reconciling the
important public policy objectives that the NTSA and the I.R.C. respectively
advance.
I. HISTORY OF RAILBANKING AND THE NATIONAL TRAILS SYSTEM
ACT
Rail-trail conversions have been occurring for over eighty years,
ever since communities began to view discontinued rail corridors as ideal
locations for linear parks, greenways, and recreational trails.4 As compe-
tition from trucking and subsidization of the interstate highway system
led to the gradual shrinkage of the national rail network throughout the
twentieth century, railroads routinely shed surplus corridors through a
haphazard process confusingly called abandonment.5 At its peak in 1916,
the United States boasted 270,000 miles of railroad track.6 However, due
4 RIcHARDR. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 78A.03[2] [d] (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2007). This chapter was written by co-author Danaya C.
Wright, with the research assistance of co-author Scott Andrew Bowman.
9 Id. §§ 78A.03 [21 [bl-[c], 78A. 10[1]-[2]. The term abandonment is particularly confusing
because it is the process used by the Surface Transportation Board ("STB") to determine
if a railroad may discontinue services and be removed from the active rail network. Once
STB abandonment is complete, federal jurisdiction over the real property of the roadbed
disappears. Id. § 78A. 10 [1]. Also, states use the term abandonment when referring to the
railroads' relinquishment of rights in their real property easements, which causes termi-
nation and the unburdening of the servient estate. See id. § 78A. 10[21 [c].
6 Andrea Ferster, Rails to Trails Conversions: A Review of Legal Issues, PLANNING &
ENVTL. L., Sept. 2006, at 3.
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to the reduction and consolidation of rail services, a little over 100,000
miles remain in active use.7 Many discontinued corridors have been per-
manently broken up, passing into the ownership of adjacent landowners
through a variety of legal mechanisms.' Some parcels were sold outright
by the railroads to adjacent landowners.9 Other parcels, particularly those
held only as easements, simply terminated and the underlying servient
estate became unburdened." The physical land was often reabsorbed into
the land from which it came. Some states adopted presumptions that aban-
doned corridors merge back into adjacent land unless someone else can
prove better title to the corridor." Other corridors were converted to roads
or canals, or were transferred to state and local governments for public
purposes. 2 Less than five percent have been sold intact and converted to
recreational trails. 3
7 RAILs-To-TRAms CONSERVANCY, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINANTS:
LESSONS LEARNED AND GUIDANCE TO KEEP YOUR RAIL-TRAIL PROJECT ON TRACK 5(2004)
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINANTS], available at http://www
.railtrails.org/resources/documents/resource docs/EPAReport.pdf.
8 Ferster, supra note 6, at 4.
9 See id.
10 Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails,
Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the
Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 434 (2000).
11POWELL, supra note 4, § 78A.08 [51; see also Fambro v. Davis, 348 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Ga.
1986) ("Whenever a railroad is abandoned, the presumption is that the fee is in the adjacent
landowners and that their right extends to the center line, unless the contrary appears.");
Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co. v. Kamper, 41 So. 513, 514 (Miss. 1906) ("It only remains for us to
say that the appellee should be allowed to recover such part of the land conveyed as is
shown to have been abandoned by appellant...."); Boyles v. Mo. Friends of the Wabash
Trace Nature Trail, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 644,648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) ("When use of an ease-
ment for railroad purposes ceases, title to the fee is presumed to be in the abutting land
owners... in the absence of contrary evidence...."); Dellach v. DeNinno, 2004 PA Super.
Ct. 428, 1 7,862 A.2d 117,118 ("When a railroad abandons an easement, the right-of-way
is extinguished and the land is owned in fee simple by the owner or owners of the land
on either side of the right of way."); McLemore v. Memphis & C. R.R. Co., 69 S.W. 338,
342 (Tenn. 1902) ("We cannot construe the language of the deed to convey anything more
than an easement over the mortgaged lands to the railroad company, which was subject
to be defeated by abandonment or voluntary surrender to the owner."); Wheeling Stamping
Co. v. Warwood Land Co., 412 S.E.2d 253, 257 (W. Va. 1991).
"2 POWELL, supra note 4, § 78A. 14; see also N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 18 (McKinney 1994) (giving
the New York Department of Transportation a preferential right to acquire abandoned
railroad corridors for conversion to other public uses); Faux v. City of L.A., 432 P.2d 849,
856 (Cal. 1967) (city converted portions of rights of way into public streets); Wright &
Hester, supra note 10, at 441-53, 56; Jeffrey M. Heftman, Note, Railroad Right-of- Way
Easements, Utility Apportionments, and Shifting Technological Realities, 202 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1401 (2002).13 Of the more than 100,000 miles of railroad corridor that has been lost since the 1920s,
[Vol. 32:581584
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By 1980, however, federal officials had become concerned that too
many miles of transportation corridor were being lost through what could
only be described as neglect and indifference. 4 Little-used corridors became
breeding grounds for homeless vagrants, illegal landfills, or motocross or
snowmobile routes. Despite posting no-trespassing signs, railroads could
not effectively police their unused or little-used corridors. Consequently,
if a railroad was certain that it was not going to reactivate services on a
particular line and wanted to be free of liability for injuries to trespassers,
it would generally offer the corridor land for sale at auction. Adjacent land-
owners would purchase pieces adjacent to their lots, municipal govern-
ments would purchase valuable portions running through their commercial
and industrial districts, or adjacent businesses would purchase portions
in order to protect pre-existing easements or access across the tracks to
highways, shipping ports, grain silos, or other services. Even state high-
way departments might acquire a discontinued corridor for conversion or
expansion of highway needs.
As rapid residential development during the 1970s occurred, often
without proper attention to the provision of adequate parks, many commu-
nities and recreational user groups identified abandoned railroad corridors
as ideal locations for linear parks, recreational trails, or urban pedestrian
zones.' 5 As Americans became more interested in fitness, the jogging and
bicycle trails that would keep users away from vehicular traffic began
attracting significant numbers of users. 6 Thus, rails-to-trails was born.'
7
less than 5,000 have been railbanked under the federal railbanking law. See Ferster,
supra note 6, at 3. An additional 9,000 miles have been converted to trails under other
mechanisms. See Rails-To-Trails Conservancy, About Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, http/
www.railtrails.org/whoweare/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2008) (stating that nearly
14,000 total miles of rails have been converted to trails).
14 See Rails-To-Trails Conservancy, Railbanking: History of Railbanking, http://www
.railstotrails.org/whatwedoltralbuilding/technicalassistancetoolbox/20070906_railbanking
_history.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
15 See POWELL, supra note 4, § 78A.03 [2] [d]; Peter Harnik, The History of the Rail-Trail
Movement, http://www.railtrails.org/whatwedo/railtrailinfo/history.html (last visited
Mar. 25, 2008).
16 See Harnik, supra note 15 ("[RI ail-trails have begun to make a significant mark, with...
over 100 million users per year.").
17 Id. Although corridors had been converted before the 1980s, the creation of the
Rails-to-Trails Conservancy ("RTC") dramatically improved the odds that a corridor
would be converted. By providing financial support, quick notice of potential railroad
abandonments, and legal and technical assistance, RTC has helped hundreds of govern-
mental entities and trails groups with rails-to-trails conversions. For further information
on RTC and its history, see Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, About Rails to Trails Conservancy,
http://www.railtrails.org/whoweare.index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
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A small group of environmentalists, bicyclists, lawyers, and alter-
native transportation advocates devised an ingenious way to preserve
rail corridors for possible future rail use while allowing for interim recre-
ational trails. That mechanism is called railbanking, and it was adopted
by Congress in 1983 through amendments to the 1967 National Trails
System Act.' 8 Railbanking occurs when a railroad, seeking authorization
from the Surface Transportation Board ("STB") to discontinue rail services
and abandon a corridor, 9 negotiates with a trail group for interim trail
use, and the STB issues a railbanking order, either following a Notice of
Interim Trail Use ("NITU") or a Certificate of Interim Trail Use ("CITU"),
preserving the corridor for future rail use and allowing interim trail use.2"
The 1983 NTSA amendment, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), pro-
vides that all property rights of a railroad will remain intact during the
period of railbanking and interim trail use, on the ground that the corridor
is being preserved for potential future rail use.2' Clearly, if a railroad owns
18 National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-11, sec. 208, § 8, 97
Stat. 42, 48 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000)). For the legislative history
of the 1983 Act, see H.R. REP. No. 98-28 (1983), as reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 112;
S. REP. No. 98-1 (1983).
19 The Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), established in 1887, originally had
jurisdiction over interstate railroad services and railroad abandonments after 1920.
However, the ICC was abolished in 1995 and replaced by the STB, under the Department
of Transportation. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 201, 109 Stat.
803, 932; POWELL, supra note 4, § 78A.03[2] [b]-[c]. For most purposes, the authority of
the ICC and the STE are the same and the acronyms are used interchangeably, depending
on the date of the agency actions.
20 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29 (2007).
Railbanking is a process by which the railroad negotiates with a qualified
trail manager to assume financial and legal responsibility for the cor-
ridor during interim trail use and to hold all property rights intact for
potential future rail reactivation. If a qualified trail group requests time
to negotiate with the railroad before the issuance of the final certificate
of abandonment, then a... NITU or... CITU will issue, allowing 180
days for negotiating with a trail group for conversion to a recreational
trail. If the negotiations are successful, the STB will issue a railbanking
order.
POWELL, supra note 4, § 78A.10[1] (citations omitted). "NITUs and CITUs are issued during
the negotiation process to allow for the sale or transfer of a rail corridor to a qualified trail
group." Id. at n.11 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29).
21 The exact language states:
The Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Surface Trans-
portation Board, and the Secretary of the Interior, in administering the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 [45 U.S.C.A.
§ 801 et seq.], shall encourage State and local agencies and private
[Vol. 32:581586
20081 CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS FOR RAIL-TRAIL CONVERSIONS 587
its corridor land in fee simple absolute, the change in use from railroads
to trails will not terminate the railroad's property rights.22 But if a rail-
road owns only a defeasible fee interest, which terminates upon discon-
tinuation of railroad services, those parcels might revert to the original
grantor of the land if the corridor is converted to a trail.23 Similarly, if the
railroad owns only an easement for railroad use, discontinuation of rail-
road services and sale of the corridor might cause the easements to be
extinguished under state law.24 But under the railbanking statute, these
lesser interests remain intact during the interim trail use period and do
not terminate.25 Because most railroad corridor land was acquired in the
nineteenth century through any number of different methods (private sale,
private donation, eminent domain, prescription, or government grant),
most corridors consist of parcels owned in a variety of different interests:
some in fee simple absolute, some in fee simple determinable, and others
in easement.2 6 A small corridor as short as a mile might have been acquired
through dozens of different transactions and be held in any combination
of these interests.
One of the most fragile property interests a railroad can hold is
an easement, often defined under state law as being a right to use the
interests to establish appropriate trails using the provisions of such
programs. Consistent with the purposes of that Act, and in furtherance
of the national policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for
future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation corri-
dors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation use, in the case
of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way pursuant to
donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent with
the National Trails System Act .... if such interim use is subject to
restoration or reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall
not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment
of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes.
16 U.S.C. § 1247(d).
" See King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002); Miller v. United
States, 67 Fed. Cl. 542, 544 (2005); Dep't of Conservation ex rel. People v. Fairless, 653
N.E.2d 446, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
23 POWELL, supra note 4, §78A.10[2] [b]. State marketable title acts may also terminate
the reversion, effectively converting the railroads' interests to fee simple absolute and
extinguishing any future interests that would defeat the railroads' right to railbank. Id.
§78A.08[1]; see also Lowers v. United States, 663 N.W.2d 408,410 (Iowa 2003); Severns
v. Union Pac. R.R., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 109 (Ct. App. 2002).
24 See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Glosemeyer v.
United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 771, 777 (2000).
25 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d).
26 Wright & Hester, supra note 10, at 376-77.
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surface of the corridor land for a particular use: running trains.2 v Once
rail service ends, the easement might be extinguished under state law,
even though mere non-use is not sufficient to terminate an easement."
In some states, fractionation of the corridor,29 seeking federal abandonment
authority,3 ° or a letter from a railroad ceding all interests in a particular
corridor 3 is sufficient to cause termination of railroad easements. But the
railbanking statute specifically holds that these easements will remain
valid during an interim trail use period because the corridor is being
used for railroad purposes; it is being preserved for possible future rail
reactivation.32 A number of courts have recognized that corridor preser-
vation constitutes a legitimate railroad use.33
Thus, after 1983, a railroad interested in abandoning a line could
choose to railbank the corridor if a trail group agreed to assume respon-
sibility for the corridor, use it for interim trail use, and give it back if the
railroad needs to reactivate. Railbanking is an attractive option for rail-
roads for numerous reasons. It allows railroads to rid themselves of un-
wanted corridors through a single transaction to a single buyer. It allows
them the right to retake the corridor if they change their minds or sub-
sequently determine that rail service is profitable.34 It allows them to
27 See Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1537; Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Toews v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 58, 61 (2002).
28 See, e.g., Toews, 53 Fed. Cl. at 61-63. The common law of all states provides that
easements are abandoned only through intent to abandon and acts consummating that
abandonment. POWELL, supra note 4, § 78A. 10[2] [a]. However, some states have revised
their abandonment laws by statute. See infra note 30.
29 Diaz v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Elgin, 786 N.E.2d 1033, 1043 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002); Buffalo Twp. v. Jones, 813 A.2d 659, 665 (Pa. 2002); Saluda Motor Lines, Inc. v.
Crouch, 386 S.E.2d 290, 292 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
30 For example, Indiana has provided by statute that obtaining federal abandonment
authority, followed by 10 years of nonuse, constitutes abandonment of state law railroad
easements. IND. CODE § 32-23-11-6 (2002).
31 See Mich. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc., 699 N.W.2d 272
(Mich. 2005); State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2004). But see Strong v. Detroit &
Mackinac Ry. Co., 423 N.W.2d 266,269 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) ("We do not believe that the
use of the term 'abandoned' in D & M's 1948 notice of claim showed an intent to abandon
its property interest in the right-of-way.").
32 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000).
33 See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 19 (1990); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694,
702 (D.C. Cir. 1988); State by Wash. Wildlife Pres., Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d 543, 547
(Minn. 1983); Erie Metroparks Bd. of Comm'rs v. Key Trust Co. of Ohio, 764 N.E.2d 509,
515 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Birdsboro Mun. Auth. v. Reading Co. & Wilmington & N. R.R.,
2000 PA Super. 231, 21, 758 A.2d 222, 227 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
' At least five railbanked corridors have been reactivated. See BG & CM R.R., Inc.,
Exemption from 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Finance Docket No. 34399, 2003 WL 22379168
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escape tort liability to trespassers on unused corridors and the environ-
mental liability from a century of heavy industrial railroad use.35 It allows
them to retain income from fiber optic, utility, or other incidental uses that
they authorized on the corridors while the line was still active.36 It allows
them to avoid the liability for demolition of structures or restoration of
land.37 It allows them to "green" their image as they advertise their partner-
ships with conservation and recreational users. And, as we discuss below,
it might allow them a federal income tax deduction when they transfer
the corridor to a charitable transferee, such as a local government or non-
profit trail group."
Although many rail-trails have been constructed without the benefit
of the federal railbanking process, those non-railbanked trails have often
been the subject of litigation over the nature of property rights trans-
ferred to the trail owner.39 Railroads and trail groups have had to defend
each individually deeded or acquired parcel of land comprising the cor-
ridor from attacks by adjacent landowners who feel that abandoned cor-
ridors should be merged into their own back yards.4" And although the
(STB Oct. 17,2003); Ga. Great S. Div., S.C. Cent. R.R. Co., Inc., Abandonment & Discon-
tinuance Exemption Between Albany & Dawson in Terrell, Lee, & Dawson Counties, Ga.,
Docket No. AB-389 (Sub-No. 1X), 2003 WL 21132515 (STB May 9, 2003); Mo. Pac. R.R.
Co., Abandonment Exemption in St. Louis County, Mo., Docket No. AB-3 (Sub-No. 98X),
1997 WL 201480 (STB Apr. 18,1997); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., Abandonment Between
St. Marys & Minister in Auglaize County, Ohio, 9 I.C.C.2d 1015 (1993); Iowa Power, Inc.,
Constr. Exemption in Council Bluffs, Iowa, 8 I.C.C.2d 858 (1990).
31 See Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. STB, 267 F.3d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See
generally UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINANTS, supra note 7, at 8 (detailing
how trail developers-rather than railroads-can protect themselves against environmental
liability).
36 RAILS-TO-TRAELs CONSERVANCY, FACT SHEET: RAiL-TRAILS & UTILITIES (1997), available
at http'//www.railtrails.org/resources/documents/resource-docs/tgc-fs-shared.pdf; see also
Wright & Hester, supra note 10, at 359; Heftman, supra note 12, at 1410-11.
31 See, e.g., N.Y. R.R. LAW § 93-b (McKinney 1991) (imposing a post-abandonment demo-
lition obligation for grade crossings and grade-separation structures).31 See infra Part III.A.
3' The issue is whether the railroad's property rights are sufficiently robust to withstand
the transfer to a trail group for a new recreational trail use. See, e.g., Clark v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 737 N.E.2d 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Maas v. Penn Cent. Corp., 2004 OH Ct. App.
7233, 2004 WL 3090396.4
°A quick overview of the Preseault litigation shows how avid some landowners are. The
Preseaults litigated the issue of ownership of a railroad easement adjacent to their property
to the Vermont Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S.
Claims Court, and the Federal Circuit before finally receiving compensation from the
Court of Federal Claims. See Trs. of the Diocese of Vt. v. State, 296 A.2d 151 (Vt. 1985)
(finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction over federal issues); Preseault v. ICC, 853 F.2d
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constitutionality of the railbanking statute has been challenged on its face,
the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in 1990 by holding that
it is a permissible exercise of Congress's interstate commerce power.41
The Court left open, however, the question of whether railbanking and
interim trail use constitutes a taking of adjacent landowners' property
rights. Since that time, dozens of takings challenges have been filed over
railbanked corridors.42 The Federal Circuit has determined that whether
the act constitutes a taking depends on the property rights the railroad
145 (2d Cir. 1988) (affrming the ICC's grant of an exemption to the railroad and upholding
the constitutionality of the railbanking statute), affd, Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990);
Preseault v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 818 (1992) (finding the Preseaults had a property
interest under state law but not deciding whether federal law preempted these state
property rights); Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992) (finding no taking of
property under federal law), rev'd en banc, Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (plurality opinion) (finding a property right in the Preseaults and a taking).
Following the 1996 Federal Circuit en banc decision, the Court of Federal Claims awarded
the Preseaults takings compensation, Preseault v. United States, No. 90-4044L, 2001 U.S.
Claims LEXIS 274 (Fed. Cl. May 22, 2001), and attorney's fees, Preseault v. United States,
52 Fed. Cl. 667 (2002). Subsequently, the Preseaults brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
actions against the municipality for installing fiber optic cable line across their property
without just compensation. The district court granted the city's motion for summary
judgment in Preseault v. City of Burlington, No. 02-CV-167, 2004 WL 2732179 (D. Vt.
Feb. 5, 2004). On appeal the Second Circuit certified the question of the municipality's
rights to lay fiber optic cables to the Vermont Supreme Court in Preseault v. City of
Burlington, 412 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005). The Vermont Supreme Court responded that the
placement of the utility lines did not unreasonably burden the plaintiffs' land beyond the
original intent of the conveyance or condemnation of the right-of-way in Preseault v. City
of Burlington, 2006 VT 63, 908 A.2d 419. The Second Circuit, upon receipt ofthe Vermont
Supreme Court decision, held that the city did not violate the takings clause or § 1983.
Preseault v. City of Burlington, 464 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2006).41 Preseault, 494 U.S. at 18.
42 For cases findings some liability, see Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Swisher v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (D. Kan. 2001); Moore v. United
States, 63 Fed. Cl. 781 (2005); Hubbert v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 73 (2004); Town of
Grantwood Vill. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 481 (2003); Preseault, 2001 U.S. Claims
LEXIS 274; Glosemeyer v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 771 (2000). For a case finding no
liability, see Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 545 (1997), affd, 230
F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For cases dismissed on statute of limitation grounds, see Barclay
v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Kan. 2004), affd, 443 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Renewal Body Works v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 609 (2005), affd, Barclay v.
United States, 443 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Caldwell v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 193
(2003), affd, 391 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For other relevant rails-to-trails takings
cases, see Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Lowers v. United States,
No. 99-cv-90039, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23899 (S.D. Iowa May 4, 2001) (discussing class
certification); Beres v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 403 (2005).
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owned and the individual state's laws relating to those rights when rail
service is discontinued.43 Some courts have stated that compensation is
due to landowners adjacent to parcels held only as easements when, under
state law, discontinuation of railroad services would ordinarily constitute
termination of the easement." Other courts have held that compensation
is not due to landowners because some state laws permit the conversion
of railroad easements to other public transportation uses,4" or impose
affirmative duties on reversionary interest holders.46
Although the legal questions raised by the takings cases have been
the subject of the bulk of scholarly commentary on rail-trail conversions,47
scholars have also addressed some state law property issues," the history
of railroad property rights," and the rights of railroads to authorize utility
' Toews, 376 F.3d 1371; Preseault, 100 F.3d 1525. The Third Circuit also held that
abandonment was a determination to be made under state law. Lucas v. Twp. of Bethel,
137 F. App'x 450 (3d Cir. 2005).
" Toews, 376 F.3d 1371; Moore, 63 Fed. Cl. 781; Hubbert v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 613
(2003); Amaliksen v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 167 (2003) (holding that the railroad had
a fee simple interest, not an easement); Glosemeyer, 45 Fed. Cl. 771.
" See Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055 (Md. 1999).
46 See Lowers v. United States, 663 N.W.2d 408 (Iowa 2003); N.Y. TRANsP. LAW § 18
(McKinney 2008).47 See, e.g., Richard A. Allen, Does the Rails-to-Trails Act Effect a Taking of Property?, 31
TRANSP. L.J. 35 (2004); Thomas A. Duda, Comment, The Use of Discontinued Railroad
Rights-of-Way as Recreational Hiking and Biking Trails: Does the National Trails System
Act Sanction Takings?, 33 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 205 (1988); Danaya C. Wright, Eminent
Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking: Can Recreational Trails Survive the Court's Fifth
Amendment Takings Jurisprudence?, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 399 (2001).
4 See, e.g., Robin M. Wolpert, Preserving and Promoting Minnesota's Recreational Trails:
State v. Hess, 31 WM. MITcHELLL. REV. 1133 (2005); Danaya C. Wright, Trains, Trails, and
Property Law: Indiana Law and the Rails-to-Trails Controversy, 31 IND. L. REV. 753 (1998);
Danaya C. Wright, Private Rights and Public Ways: Property Disputes and Rails-to-
Trails in Indiana, 30 IND. L. REV. 723 (1997); Gregg H. Hirakawa, Note, Preserving
Transportation Corridors for the Future: Another Look at Railroad Deeds in Washington
State, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 481 (2001); Marc A. Sennewald, Note, The Nexus of Federal
and State Law in Railroad Abandonments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (1998); Karla Vehrs,
Comment, Minnesota Rails-to-Trails on the Line in State v. Hess, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1544
(2005); Elizabeth F.R. Gingerich,Abandonment ofRailroad Property:A Guide forAttorneys
and Landowners, RES GESTAE, Oct. 2003, at 24.49 See, e.g., Rita Cain, Unhappy Trails-Disputed Use of Railroad Rights-of-Way Under
the National Trails System Act, 5 LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 211 (1989); Robin Foster, RLTD
Railway Corporation v. Surface Transportation Board: A Jurisdictional Derailment-
Has the Sixth Circuit Thrown the Switch on the Congressional Policy of Promoting
"Railbanking," the Conversion of Abandoned Railroad Tracks into Recreational Hiking
and Biking Trails?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 601 (2000); Charles H. Montange, Fixing the
Unbroken in the Federal Use Statute: A Rejoinder to "Unhappy Trails," 6 LAND USE &
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and other incidental uses on their corridors.50 To date, however, no one
has thoroughly studied the newly emerging question of how the railbank-
ing statute should interact with the I.R.C. and its rules on charitable de-
ductions.5 The dual goals of railbanking-interim trail use and corridor
preservation-may conflict if a railroad chooses to re-enter and reactivate
services, necessitating removal of the trail. This tension is precisely what
can lead to conflicts with the I.R.C. charitable deduction provisions.5 2 This
Article charts new territory by examining the ways the I.R.C. and the rail-
banking statute conflict to frustrate the national transportation goals of
the railbanking statute, as well as providing a potential way to harmonize
the two areas of law.
To understand the problem, however, one must understand the
intricacies of the legal mechanisms at issue. The principal justification for
the railbanking statute, and that upon which the entire process depends,
is that preservation of the intact corridor constitutes a continuing railroad
purpose. Preservation is an important public policy because future trans-
portation needs may require use of these unused corridors for rail service,
highway service, national defense needs, or whatever transportation needs
new technologies may inspire. Key to the preservation purpose is the right
of the railroad either to re-enter and reactivate, or to re-enter and transfer
the corridor for rail transportation purposes to another railroad, which
must be granted to the abandoning railroad by the interim trail manager
as part of the railbanking/interim trail use agreement.' Without the right
to re-enter the preservation purpose of the corridor would be jeopardized,
because the railroad either would have to convince a trail group to sell the
corridor back voluntarily, or it would have to exercise eminent domain
at prohibitive cost to reacquire the land.
ENVTL. L. 53 (1990); Sheila K Bryant, Note, The Constitutionality of Rails-to-Trails
Conversions Under the National Trails Act Amendments of 1983: Preseault v. ICC, 26
TULSA L.J. 295 (1990); Roger M. Stahl, Note, Smoke Along the Tracks: The Constitu-
tionality of Converting Rails-to-Trails Under 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), 16 WM. MITcHELL L.
REV. 861 (1990).
50 See, e.g., Wright & Hester, supra note 10; Heftman, supra note 12; Jill K Pearson, Note,
Balancing Private Property Rights with Public Interests: Compensating Landowners for
the Use of Railroad Corridors for Fiber-Optic Technology, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1769 (1999).
51 But see Conrad Teitell, Railroad Right-of-Way Gift: Deductible?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 24,
2006, at 3, whose basic overview provided the foundation for this Article.
52 See POWELL, supra note 4, § 78A.16.
'3 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-28, at 8 (1983).
" POWELL, supra note 4, § 78A.11[2]-[3]. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(3) and (d)(2) require the
interim trail user to acknowledge that the corridor is subject to reactivation.
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There is some disagreement over whether this right to re-enter and
reactivate is simply a right to reactivate rail service without needing to go
before the STB for permission to construct and operate the railroad (i.e.,
a right that exists solely between the railroad and the STB), or whether
it attaches in any way to the property rights in the actual corridor land
and is binding on the trail group that now possesses it. Logically, it must
be the latter. The right of the railroad to reactivate is a right to reactivate
that particular line and is thus tied in some way to the particular corridor
land.5" Also, the trail groups that acquire deeds to the corridor land do so
subject to the railroad's rights to reactivate.56 Even deeds that do not
expressly include a right to re-enter or a power of termination are given
"pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d)," which establishes the framework for
permitting interim trail use while corridor conservation continues.57 The
entire purpose of the railbanking statute would be frustrated if the rail-
road did not have a property right to reacquire the corridor land, because
then a trail group could either sell parcels of the land for non-trail purposes
and break up the corridor, or it could call to its defense state trespass law
if the railroad attempted to re-enter.58 Either of these actions would frus-
trate the corridor conservation purposes of the statute.
Furthermore, even if the limitations on subdivision and sale im-
posed on the trail group inure to the government or the STB, the railroad
would be entitled to have its rights restored to it upon STB approval of
reactivation. This is not to say that the railroad is entitled to reacquire
the corridor land at any time and at no cost; certainly, conditions may be
" The STB requires that in the contract of sale between the railroad and an interim trail
user (and it is notably an "interim" user), the trail user must acknowledge the railroad's
right to reactivate if it so desires. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(3) (requiring the interim trail
user to acknowledge that "use of the right-of-way is subject to . . . possible future
reconstruction and reactivation of the right-of-way for rail service").
56 See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000).
17 Smith v. Palmetto Conservation Found., CA No. 8:03-1587-20, slip. op. (D.S.C. 2004).
In finding that a deed and contract that merely reference the Trails Act are sufficient to
constitute an interim trail use agreement, the court stated that "[tihe possibility of resto-
ration of rail service is the essence of any agreement made subsequent to the issuance
of a NITU and need not be expressly indicated." Id. at *5.
' If a railroad did not have a property right to reacquire and reactivate, and it simply
alerted the trail manager that it was going to reactivate rail services and started re-
building trackage on the trail, the trail manager would surely file suit for an injunction
claiming trespass under state law. Whether any court would honor the state trespass law
over the federal railbanking law in light of the deeds and agreements that acknowledge
the railroad's rights to reactivate has not been litigated, but we believe no court would
do so.
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imposed by deed or by law on the railroad's exercise of its right to re-enter.
Some trail use agreements require that the railroad compensate the trail
group by reimbursing it for the costs of improvements or by paying fair
market value. Provisions like this make the railroads' rights look like
options to purchase, but these options are still property rights that inhere
in the railroads. Random third parties do not have the right to force a trail
group into court to negotiate a fair price if the trail group is unwilling to
sell: the railroad does. And even when the deeds are silent on the terms or
conditions of reacquisition, the railroads certainly have the power to bring
the trail group to the bargaining table.
At most times the interests of the railroads and the trail groups
converge when the corridor is railbanked and used for interim trail use.
However, there are those instances when a railroad wants to reactivate,
and the trail group opposes it, that their interests diverge. Although this
has not occurred often, it can be a bitter and expensive process if the
parties do not understand the rights that each possesses. If a railroad has
the right to operate rail service by virtue of the railbanking agreement
but no authority to compel restoration of the corridor, the railbanking
statute would be rendered virtually meaningless, so much so that the vital
function of holding easements and defeasible fee interests in abeyance
would be undermined. If the railroad has the right to re-enter without any
concern for the trail group, however, the interim trail use function would
be frustrated, and fundamental equity rights would be trampled. Thus,
when the interests of railroads and trails groups diverge during reacti-
vation, it is important that courts take into account the dual purposes of
the federal statute and attempt to devise a solution that serves both ends.59
Imposing an obligation on the railroad to pay fair market value or to re-
imburse the cost of improvements to a trail group serves equitable ends
and goes a long way toward ameliorating the negative effects of the partial
interest rule.6"
This right to reactivate, whether it is a right to re-enter, a power of
termination, a pre-emptive right, an option to purchase, or some similar
property right, is a contingent future interest that is carved out of the
railroad's property rights in the corridor and retained when it transfers
the present possessory estate to the interim trail user. Consequently,
when the railroad transfers less than the full panoply of property rights
it owns by entering into an interim trail use/railbanking agreement, it
59 See infra Part III.C.3.
0 See infra Part IV.
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potentially runs afoul of the I.R.C. rules on charitable deductions. To the
extent the I.R.C. requires the transfer of all of a railroad's property rights
in order to qualify for the deduction, the denial of the deduction may be
enough to discourage a railroad from railbanking and allowing conversion
to trail use. Such a consequence would impede the important national pub-
lic policy of preserving intact rail corridors. In fact, it would erode a major
application of 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k), which is designed to facilitate chari-
table deductions for contributions of land to the National Trails System.6 '
While railroads are faced with the challenge of successfully navigating
a quagmire of complex tax provisions, further administrative and legis-
lative measures may be necessary to ensure that the I.R.C. provisions do
not swallow the policy objectives of the NTSA.
II. THE PARTIAL INTEREST RULE
A. The Creation of the Partial Interest Rule
I.R.C. § 170 generally allows a taxpayer to deduct the amount of
any charitable contribution that the taxpayer makes during the taxable
year.62 A charitable contribution is rather broadly defined under the I.R.C.
and includes donations made to a non-profit organization for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, and donations made
to a state or local government if made for exclusively public purposes.63
These seemingly generous provisions, however, are conditioned and eroded
by other provisions of § 170.
Notable among these is the partial interest rule set forth in §
170(f)(3)(A). This rule provides that a taxpayer is not entitled to any
charitable deduction if the taxpayer contributes less than the taxpayer's
entire interest in transferred property.' The partial interest rule was
created as part of an amendment to § 170 under the Tax Reform Act of
1969.65 It was designed to help eliminate perceived abuses of the chari-
table deduction by taxpayers who donated income interests, remainder
" Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) (2000).
6 2 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1). Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Internal Revenue Code
and Treasury Regulations refer to the statute or regulation currently in force as of the
date of this Article.
6Id. § 170(c).
6 Id. § 170(f)(3)(A).
65 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(1), 83 Stat. 549, 549-58.
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interests, or other partial gifts to charity.66 The amendment to § 170(f)(3)(A)
was especially tailored to eliminate charitable deductions in cases where
the taxpayer permitted the charity to use the property for only a period
of time.6' Denying a deduction for mere use prevents what was seen as,
in essence, a double benefit for the taxpayer: the taxpayer reduced actual
gross income by foregoing the income that the asset could have produced
if not used by the charity, and the taxpayer also received a deduction in
calculating taxable income for the same foregone income that the asset
would have produced.6" In this sense, the foregone income was subtracted
twice. This prohibition on deductions for charitable use remains the law
today.69 Thus, where a donor retains a remainder or reversionary interest,
in most instances the partial interest rule denies the donor a charitable
deduction, unless the retained interest is held in trust subject to very
specific requirements.0
These amendments were important steps to eliminate abuse, par-
ticularly where non-income-producing assets were at issue, and to pro-
mote the important policy underlying the charitable deduction by ensuring
that only bona fide contributions are permitted. Yet the application of the
partial interest rule sweeps broadly, yielding potentially inequitable
66 Thomas R. Moore, Estate Planning Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969: The Uses of
Charity, 56 VA. L. REV. 565, 570-74 (1970) (discussing the goals of the Tax Reform Act of
1969).6 7 Id. at 573-74 n.51.
6' For example, consider a taxpayer who owns rental property, the entire rental value of
which is $100,000. Under the law prior to the amendment, if the taxpayer permitted the
charity to use 10% of the property, its $100,000 income would be reduced $10,000 by the
foregone income and an additional $10,000 by the value of the property the charity used.
Id.; Arthur B. Custy & David A. Solberg, Charitable Contributions Deduction Under the
Tax Reform Act of 1969,7 WILLAMErE L.J. 207, 217-19 (1971); see also Threlfall v. United
States, 302. F. Supp. 1114, 1116-18 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Passailaigue v. United States, 224
F. Supp. 682, 683-84, 687 (M.D. Ga. 1963).6 9 See Logan v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 658-59 (1994) (denying taxpayer a charitable
deduction for storing county fire engine in garage); Stjernholm v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M.
(CCH) 389,390-92 (1989), affd, 933 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1991) (denying taxpayer deduction
for permitting charity to use a specialized vehicle for medical services).
70 Note that where the trust grantor retains a remainder interest and the charity is
permitted to use the property, the charity in essence receives the income interest from
the trust. Following the 1969 amendments and under present law, the income interest must
be either in the form of a guaranteed annuity or a fixed percentage of the trust corpus to
be distributed no less than annually to the charity. I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(B). Charitable
remainder interests must also meet certain requirements. See id. § 644 (specifying
charitable remainder trust requirements); id. § 642(c)(5) (regarding pooled income fund
requirements).
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results. This is particularly so because the rule is an all-or-nothing one;
if the taxpayer falls into the partial interest trap, the deduction is dis-
allowed in its entirety. 71 For this reason, the IRS and the courts have
recognized two major exceptions to § 170(f)(3)(A): the insubstantiality rule
and the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible doctrine.
B. The Insubstantiality Rule
The insubstantiality rule is derived from Treasury Regulation
§ 1.170A-7(b)(1)(i) and provides that when a taxpayer retains only an
insubstantial interest in the contributed property, the taxpayer should
not suffer a denial of the charitable deduction.7 2 Accordingly, when the
taxpayer successfully demonstrates that the insubstantiality rule applies,
the taxpayer is entitled to the entire charitable deduction. The all-or-
nothing nature of the partial interest rule requires this more equitable
application of the law, and policy reasons support such a rule. Given that
the underlying purpose of I.R.C. § 170 is to encourage charitable giving,
it would be unreasonable to frustrate a donor's charitable intent by wholly
disallowing a deduction where the donor retained only an insignificant
interest or subjected the donation to trivial contingencies. Instead, where
the retained interest is insubstantial, the practice is to simply disregard
the minor retained interest and grant the taxpayer the entire deduction. 3
The insubstantiality rule has predominantly been developed by
the IRS through a string of revenue rulings that it has issued on the appli-
cation of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-7(b)(1)(i). Somewhat problem-
atically, at least for tax lawyers who like certainty in their planning, no
bright-line test has emerged to determine whether a retained interest is
substantial.74 This leaves the application of the rule highly fact dependent
71E.g., Comm'r v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 236 (1955) (holding that the tax
code either allows or entirely defeats a taxpayer's claim to a charitable deduction); United
States v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26,28-29 (1st Cir. 1995); Canal Nat'l Bank v. United States, 258
F. Supp. 626, 633-34, 638 (D. Maine 1966); Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 190 F.
Supp. 671, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
72 This rule is not expressly stated in the regulation, but inferred from the requirement
that "[an undivided portion of a donor's entire interest in property must consist of a
fraction or percentage of each and every substantial interest . . . ." Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-7(b)(1)(i). The inference is that if the interest is insubstantial, the regulation
does not apply.
73 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006) (citing Stark v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.
243, 252-53 (1986)).
71 See infra notes 77-114.
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and potentially amorphous. Moreover, the factual scenarios of the rulings
have presented relatively straightforward cases where the substance of the
interest is easily classified, with the mere right to train one's dog on the
one hand, 5 versus retained pecuniary interests or incidents of ownership
on the other.76
Thus, in the first Revenue Ruling on the issue, Revenue Ruling
75-66, 77 the IRS considered the availability of a charitable deduction for
a taxpayer who had contributed land to the United States government
and retained the right during his lifetime to train his personal hunting
dogs on the property's trails. Additionally, the taxpayer agreed to do so
only in accordance with Interior Department regulations.78 The fact that
the taxpayer's retained right to use the property was personal and termi-
nated upon his death, coupled with the fact that such use was subject to
the donee's approval, rendered the retained interest of inconsequential
value. 79 Allowing such a minimal interest to disqualify the deduction is
precisely what the insubstantiality rule avoids. The IRS held so much,
stating that the taxpayer's retained right was not substantial enough to
require the denial of the charitable deduction.8 °
The following year, the IRS began targeting retained interests at
the other end of the spectrum-those in which the donor clearly retained
a significant interest in the donated asset. Revenue Ruling 76-3 3 1" pre-
sented two examples in which the taxpayers retained pecuniary interests
in the donated assets, and the IRS found each interest to be substantial,
thus resulting in the complete disallowance of the donors' charitable de-
ductions. First, a corporation donated land to a charitable organization but
retained all rights to the minerals, including the right to sell any minerals
extracted from the land. 2 Second, a fifty-year-old individual owned timber-
land subject to an outstanding sixty-year lease.8 3 The individual trans-
ferred the property to a charitable organization subject to the individual's
right to receive all the lease payments during the individual's lifetime.'
75 Rev. Rul. 75-66, 1975-1 C.B. 85.
76 Rev. Rul. 76-331, 1976-2 C.B. 52.
77 Rev. Rul. 75-66, 1975-1 C.B. 85.
78 id.
791 Id. at 86.
80 Id.
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At the individual's death, the charity was to obtain all rights in the land,
including the remaining lease income.85 The Revenue Ruling recognized
the insubstantiality rule, stating that if the donors had retained only
insubstantial rights, they would have complied with the requirements of
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-7(b)(1)(i).86 However, the right to exploit
and sell minerals and the right to lease payments as retained rights in
the property were substantial.87 The right of the corporation to mine not
only reserved a significant pecuniary interest, but also left the corporation
with a vested right to disturb the charity's use.8" Lease payments by their
very nature are a continuing stream of income from the property; over
the remaining life expectancy of a fifty-five-year-old, these would aggre-
gate to a sizeable amount. The IRS appropriately held such rights to be
substantial. 9
Similar to cases in which a donor retains a pecuniary interest in
the donated assets, the IRS has twice ruled that the retention of incidents
of ownership in an asset will be substantial.9 ° An "incident of ownership"
is a term of art under the tax code, which is generally used to refer to a
85 Id. The taxpayer potentially could have avoided the disallowance of the deduction by
using a charitable remainder trust. Section 170(f)(3) does not apply to a transfers in
trust, and § 170(f)(2) allows a deduction if the trust is a charitable remainder annuity
trust or charitable remainder unitrust (under § 664) or a pooled income fund (under §
642(c)(5)). See I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)-(3). If the aggregate annual payments under the timber
lease would have equaled at least five percent of the property, then the taxpayer likely
could have created a qualified charitable remainder trust and received the deduction. See
id. § 664(d)(2).
8 See Rev. Rul. 76-331, 1976-2 C.B. 52, 53.
7See id. Revenue Ruling 76-331 also distinguishes the factual scenarios it presents from
the facts of Revenue Ruling 75-373. In Revenue Ruling 75-373, the IRS found that a
taxpayer who donated an easement of fifty feet of beachfront property in gross and in
perpetuity to the county was entitled to a charitable deduction. Rev. Rul. 75-373, 1975-2
C.B. 77. The easement allowed the county to operate and maintain the property as a
public beach and recreational area. The taxpayer retained mineral rights, the right to
access the water, and the use of a channel through the property to adjacent land. The
taxpayer also agreed to remain liable for all property taxes, assessments, and levies. Id.
Although these rights seem substantial, the taxpayer fell within a special provision con-
tained in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-7(b)(1)(ii), which deems easements in gross and
in perpetuity to be an undivided portion of the donor's interest. Id. at 78. This provision
then triggers the § 170(f)(3)(B)(ii) exception to the § 170(f)(3)(A) partial interest rule. Id.
' Rev. Rul. 76-331, 1976-2 C.B 52, 53.
8 9
id.
" See Rev. Rul. 81-282, 1981-2 C.B. 78; Rev. Rul. 76-143, 1976-1 C.B. 63. Note that the
IRS has not explicitly used the term "incidents of ownership" in these rulings; however,
the rights at issue are certainly incidents of ownership as that term is used in the I.R.C.
and Treasury Regulations. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
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taxpayer's ability to control the beneficial or fundamental use of an asset,
despite the fact that the taxpayer might not have full fee ownership of
the asset.9 '
One such incident of ownership is the ability to designate a future
beneficiary, which the IRS addressed in Revenue Ruling 76-143.92 Here,
the IRS denied the charitable deduction in two factual scenarios involving
the irrevocable assignment of the cash surrender value of a life insurance
policy to a charitable organization, subject to the donor's right to designate
the beneficiary and assign the policy balance.93 Under the first scenario,
the policy was paid-up; under the second, it was not.94 In both circum-
stances, upon the donor's death, the charity would receive an amount
equal to the cash surrender value from the proceeds of the policy if the
donor died without having surrendered the policy.95 Although the charity
had a vested and valuable interest in the policy, the donor's ability to
change the policy beneficiary was deemed an important property inter-
est.96 Indeed, a fundamental incident of ownership of a life insurance
policy on one's own life is the ability to control who will receive the bene-
fits upon the owner's death, as the I.R.C. expressly recognizes.97 That the
91 The term "incidents of ownership" is not used in § 170(f)(3), though it does appear later
in the subsection. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(10)(D)(i), (E)(i) (providing exceptions for disallowance
of deductions in cases of certain annuity contracts and contracts held by charitable remain-
der trusts). The term is only used in two other sections of the Code. See id. § 902(c)(7)
(regarding constructive ownership rules in partnerships for purposes of calculating ten
percent ownership of foreign corporation voting stock); id. § 2042 (providing inclusion in
a decedent's gross estate the value of certain life insurance proceeds). The term appears
several times in Treasury Regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(iii) (regarding partners'
distributive shares in partnerships); Treas. Reg. § 1.465-8(b)(3) (regarding at-risk limitation
on deductions); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-22(c)(1) (regarding taxation of split-dollar life insurance
arrangements); Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(c), ex.6 (regarding definition of taxable gift);
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (regarding proceeds of life insurance); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a),
ex.2-3 (regarding valuation for estate tax purposes of life insurance and annuity contracts).
92 Rev. Rul. 76-143, 1976-1 C.B. 63.
93 See id.
94 See id.
15 See id.96 id.
17 See I.R.C. § 2042, which provides for inclusion in a decedent's gross estate the value
of the proceeds of any life insurance policy over which the decedent exercised any
"incidents of ownership." Notable among the incidents of ownership are "the power to
change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an
assignment, ... etc." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2). In this sense, the estate tax provisions
treat the right to designate the policy beneficiary as tantamount to full ownership of the
policy.
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IRS determined the donor's retained rights were substantial, even when
the charity had a vested right to the paid-up surrender value of the policy,
is not at all surprising.
The IRS also addressed a donor's retention of an incident of owner-
ship in Revenue Ruling 81-282,98 relying on its previous holding in the life
insurance cases of Revenue Ruling 76-143. In the 1981 Ruling, the IRS
considered the application of the insubstantiality rule to a taxpayer who
had contributed shares in a corporation to a charitable organization but
had retained the right to vote the contributed shares.99 Although the vot-
ing rights to common stock are not as significant as the pecuniary inter-
ests that such shares represent-namely, the ownership of a share of the
corporation's assets and the right to a portion of corporate earnings-
voting rights are nonetheless a fundamental incident of ownership in
common stock.100 Voting is the manner by which a shareholder exercises
control over the corporation and protects the financial benefits of owner-
ship. Thus, despite the fact that the taxpayer had no pecuniary interest
in the donated asset, the retained right to vote was deemed a substantial
one.10' The IRS accordingly determined that because the right gave the
shareholder a voice in the corporation and allowed the shareholder to cast
votes affecting the donee's interest in the corporation, the right to vote
could not be disregarded.1 2 As such, the retention of this substantial right
resulted in the disallowance of the taxpayer's deduction.0 3
The revenue rulings demonstrate that the IRS is likely to consider
retained pecuniary interests and incidents of ownership to be substantial,
but these are only general characterizations of the rulings that alone are
not dispositive. This is evident from the only significant judicial appli-
cation of the insubstantiality rule, which came in 1986 when the Tax Court
decided Stark v. Commissioner."° The taxpayer in Stark contributed land
9' Rev. Rul. 81-282, 1981-2 C.B. 78.
99 1d.




" Stark v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 243 (1986). Although Stark was the first case to consider the
insubstantiality doctrine in reference to charitable deductions, the Third Circuit had
previously considered the substantiality of retained rights in commercial transactions to
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to the United States Forest Service, but retained a mineral interest in the
land and the right to re-enter the land to prospect and mine for a period
of twenty-five years.a5 Although this was a pecuniary interest in the prop-
erty akin to the retained interest in Revenue Ruling 76-33 1, the right to re-
enter was subject to several restraints that limited the time and manner
in which the taxpayer could exercise the right, restraints which were
absent from the facts in the previous IRS decision."°6 Also of note was the
fact that at the time of the conveyance in Stark there were no known oil or
gas deposits on the property, and the terrain of the land was not conducive
to drilling and mining. 107
The Tax Court gave judicial recognition to the insubstantiality rule
as articulated by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 75-66 and Revenue Ruling
76-331.1°s According to the Stark court, an interest is insubstantial when
the taxpayer has, in substance, given away the taxpayer's entire interest
in the property; furthermore, the taxpayer must not be able to interfere
with the donee's interest. °9 Based upon this understanding of the rule, the
court held that the taxpayer's retained interest was insubstantial.'10 Even
though the donor retained a pecuniary interest in the property, significant
restraints upon the donor's right to re-enter the land to mine placed the
Forest Service's interest paramount to the donor's. 1 ' Furthermore, as
there were no known mineral deposits on the land and expert testimony
demonstrated that the probability of any deposits was "'very negligible,'"
determine whether the transfer was a sale or a license. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours v.
United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1055-57 (3d Cir. 1970) (considering whether retention of
certain rights in transfer of a patent gave rise to capital gain (as a sale) or to ordinary
income (as a license)).
1
0 5 See Stark, 86 T.C. at 246.
106 See id. at 246-47. Prior to re-entry, the donor or the donor's assignee had to give notice
to the Forest Service, demonstrate the authority to re-enter under the agreement, and
receive a permit to re-enter. The permit was subject to approval of safety conditions and
the payment of a permit fee. Any prospecting or mining of the land could not prevent the
full use of the land by the Forest Service, and the donor was bound to repair, replace, and
restore the land following any prospecting or mining. Id. at 46. In Revenue Ruling 76-331,
however, the taxpayer had "the sole right to exploit and sell any minerals ...." Rev. Rul.
76-331, 1976-2 C.B. 52, 53.
"o7 See Stark, 86 T.C. at 247.
'08 See id. at 251-52.
10 See id. at 252-53.
110 Id. at 255.
11' See id. at 253.
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the value of the retained interest was minimal. 112 Shortly after the peti-
tioner in Stark applied for the deduction, legislation bolstered the notion
that the retention of mineral rights is often of de minimis value by pro-
viding an exception to the partial interest rule when the donor retains an
interest only in the property's minerals." 3
Neither the Stark decision nor any of the Revenue Rulings provide
guidance by delineating factors that will be considered in weighing the
significance of a retained interest. And while the only hard-and-fast rule
seems to be that the right to walk one's dog on donated property is insub-
stantial,"4 several generalizations are worth restating. First, the ability
of the donor to interfere with the donee's use of the property may con-
stitute a substantial right. This is evident from the contrasting facts of
Revenue Ruling 76-331 and Stark. The fact that the donor in Revenue
Ruling 76-331 could re-enter to mine at any time free from the donee's
objection made that right much more robust than the narrowly specified
circumstances under which the Stark donor could re-enter. In this sense
the donor in Revenue Ruling 76-331 had a greater ability to interfere with
the donee's use and enjoyment of the property. Second, when the donor
retains some pecuniary interest in the property, factual inquiry into the
actual value of that interest is required. If that value is negligible, as it
was in Stark, then the insubstantiality rule permits the interest to be dis-
regarded. The converse would seem equally true. Finally, consideration
must be given to a donor's continuing ability to exercise control or domin-
ion over the donated property. Retention of any incident of ownership is
demonstrative of the fact that the donor has not given away every sub-
stantial interest in the property. In this respect, it is important to note
that the relevant inquiry is into whether rights incident to ownership
exist, not the probability that the donor will exercise those rights. Each
of these considerations is useful in determining the substantiality of the
rights that railroads retain under the railbanking statute."'
C. The So-Remote-as-to-be-Negligible Doctrine
The second exception to the partial interest rule is the so-remote-
as-to-be-negligible doctrine. This doctrine is derived from Treasury
112 Id. (quoting petitioner's expert witness, Geneos P. Cokinos)
"' See Pub. L. No. 96-541, § 6, 94 Stat. 3204, 3206 (1980) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 170(h)); Stark, 86 T.C. at 254.
114 See Rev. Rul. 75-66, 1975-1 C.B. 85.
15 See infra Part III.B.
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Regulations §§ 1.170A-1(e) and 1.170A-7(a)(3). 116 As stated in § 1.170A-
7(a)(3), the IRS will not deny the deduction
merely because the interest which passes to . . . the
charity may be defeated by the performance of some act
or the happening of some event, if on the date of the gift
it appears that the possibility that such act or event will
occur is so remote as to be negligible." 7
In the context of the partial interest rule, this means that if there is a
minimal probability of the donor's reversionary interest divesting the
charitable donee, then the interest will be disregarded. Like the insub-
stantiality rule, the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible doctrine reflects the
public policy consideration that a taxpayer should not be wholly denied
a charitable deduction simply because a highly improbable condition might
divest the charitable donee of its interest. Instead, when a taxpayer can
demonstrate that a condition attached to a charitable donation is so re-
mote as to be negligible, the IRS will disregard the condition and grant the
taxpayer a full deduction.""
The so-remote-as-to-be-negligible doctrine developed through the
estate tax regulations, rather than through the income tax code, beginning
with the I.R.C. of 1939. It was first considered in United States v. Dean,"'
116 Both regulations use the phrase "so remote as to be negligible," but do so in different
contexts. As used in § 1. 170A-1(e), the regulation applies to any transfer that is subject
to a condition or power. As used in § 1. 170A-7(a)(3), the regulation applies to transfers
of less than the taxpayer's entire interest. The distinction is not incredibly important.
Section 1.170A-1(e) would apply whenever there is a condition precedent to vesting or a
divesting future interest, whereas § 1.170A-7(a)(3) is applied more appropriately only in
cases where the interest not transferred to charity functions as a divesting future interest.
Accordingly, § 1. 170A-7(a)(3) is the appropriate section to apply in the railbanking cases,
as the railroads retain a future interest that can potentially divest the charity of its interest
in the corridor.
1
' Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(a)(3). Similarly, § 1.170A-1(e) states that if a gift "is dependent
upon the performance of some act or the happening of a precedent event in order that it
might become effective, no deduction is allowable unless the possibility that the charitable
transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be negligible." Treas. Reg. § 1.170A- 1(e).
"
1
' See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-7(a)(3), 1.170A-1(e). The plain language of both sections read
in the context of applying the exemptions supports this proposition.
119 United States v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 1955). Other cases had noted the
doctrine but had not addressed the precise contours of the doctrine's applicability. See
Comm'r v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 229, 229-30, 233 (1955) (considering the
availability of a deduction for a bequest that would vest only if the decedent's wife and
twenty-seven-year-old daughter died without living lineal descendants); Newton Trust
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in which the First Circuit addressed the taxpayer's claim of a charitable
deduction under I.R.C. § 812(d) (1939) for a testamentary charitable be-
quest.12 ° The bequest was to permanently take effect only if the taxpayer's
eighty-two-year-old sister predeceased both the taxpayer's sixty-seven-
year-old daughter and her sixty-eight-year-old daughter-in-law. 121 Thus,
the charitable bequest was subject to the divesting condition of an eighty-
two-year-old woman surviving two women fifteen and fourteen years her
junior. 122 Based upon actuarial mortality tables, the taxpayer and the
IRS agreed that the probability of the bequest remaining in the charity
was ninety-one percent.
123
Under the 1939 Code, the relevant provision lay in Treasury Regu-
lation § 105-81.46(a). This regulation provided that conditional charitable
bequests were deductible only when the contingency was "so remote as
to be negligible."124 Yet the First Circuit struggled to reduce to a definite
probability the degree to which a contingency must be so remote as to be
negligible. The court favorably observed its dicta from Newton Trust Co.
v. Commissioner, in which it stated that although the probability that
one person would survive another of the same age is not so remote as to be
negligible, the probability that a ninety-year-old would survive a thirty-
year-old could safely be ignored.125 The juxtaposition of these two scenarios
led the Newton court to determine that precisely where on the spectrum
particular cases might fall should be done on a case-by-case basis.126 In
Dean, the court found that the nine percent chance of the charitable be-
quest failing belonged on the not-so-remote end of the spectrum, and it
denied the deduction. 127 Despite its desire to evaluate each case on its
Co. v. Comm'r, 160 F.2d 175, 181 (1st Cir. 1947) (holding that a fifty-fifty chance that the
charitable bequest would be defeated was not so remote as to be negligible).
120 Under the estate tax provisions, a decedent is permitted a deduction for purposes of
calculating the net taxable estate for any bequest, legacy, devise, or transfer to a charitable
organization. I.R.C. § 2055(a); see also I.R.C. § 812(d) (1939).
121 Dean, 224 F.2d at 27.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 The regulation, in relevant part, provided as follows:
If as of the date of decedent's death the transfer to charity is dependent
upon the performance of some act or the happening of a precedent event
in order that it might become effective, no deduction is allowable unless
the possibility that charity will not take is so remote as to be negligible.
Treas. Reg. § 105-81.46(a) (1939).
125 Newton Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 160 F.2d 175, 181 (1st Cir. 1947).
121 See id.
127 Dean, 224 F.2d at 29.
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own merits, the court did offer a valuable rule that remains: a contin-
gency that "persons generally would disregard as so highly improbable
that it might be ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious
business transaction" would qualify as so remote as to be negligible.'28
The First Circuit's understanding of the doctrine continued to be
applied in cases involving charitable deductions for the estate tax, 29 yet
it was not until 1979 that the Tax Court, in Briggs v. Commissioner,
applied the doctrine to the income tax. 30 At issue in Briggs was whether
the taxpayer was entitled to a charitable deduction for her contribution
of land, subject to several conditions subsequent, that she donated to a
Native American charitable organization. 3' The taxpayer contributed
184 acres of land to the organization for the purpose of establishing a cul-
tural center, educational center, and medical center, all to benefit Native
Americans.'32 Pursuant to the terms of the gift agreement, the land was
granted as a fee simple condition subsequent, with a right to re-enter in
the taxpayer upon the failure of certain conditions.'33 Notably, the tax-
payer had the right to re-enter the land in the event that the organization's
board of directors dissolved within seven years of the date of the gift or if
the board failed to develop the cultural, educational, and medical centers."M
Although the taxpayer donated the property, she did not provide funding
for the construction of the centers. 35 Accordingly, the organization was
12 1 Id. The First Circuit was not the first court to test the weight of a contingency upon
a hypothetical businessman's judgment. In United States v. Provident Trust Co., the
Supreme Court considered the value of a charitable remainder subject to the contingency
that a sterile life tenant would have offspring. The Court noted that if the interest had
been offered on the open market, "every intelligent bidder" would have ignored the con-
tingency "as utterly destitute of reason." 291 U.S. 272, 286 (1934).
129 See Estate of Woodworth v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 193, 198-99 (1966) (holding that contingent
bequest in trust for the establishment of a Catholic hospital was not so remote as to be
negligible); State St. Bank & Trust v. United States, 634 F.2d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 1980); Bach
v. McGinnes, 333 F.2d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1964); Estate of Moffet v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 738,
740 (4th Cir. 1959); Estate of Marine v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 368, 384 (1991), affd, 990 F.2d
136 (4th Cir. 1993).3
' Briggs v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 646, 656-57 (1979), affd, 665 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1981).
13 1 Id. at 646-48.
132 Id. at 649.
13 Id. at 655.
'- Id. at 649, 655-56. The court also noted that, under California law, several other
requirements in the gift agreement constituted conditions subsequent. These included
provisions that prohibited the sale, transfer, or mortgage of the property and the creation
of a board of directors on which members would serve for five years, with one Clara Seele
as chairman. Id.
135 Id. at 657.
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left with the challenge of raising $4.5 million from private and corporate
donations and governmental grants.'36
As there was no prior case law interpreting the "so remote as to
be negligible" language as used in Treasury Regulation § 1. 170A-1(e), the
court relied on Dean and its progeny for guidance."' Because the language
used in § 1.170A-l(e) and § 20.2055-2(b) is identical, the court adopted
the standard applied in the estate tax cases.'38 Based upon this test, the
court ruled that the possibly of the taxpayer divesting the charity of its
interest in the property could not be disregarded.'39 Because at the time of
the donation no financing for the construction of the centers was readily
available, there was a good chance that the centers might never be built.4 °
This probability was heightened by the fact that few members of the
organization had any experience in fund-raising.' 4 1 In light of these facts,
coupled with dissension and disagreement among the board members, the
court found that the possibility that the taxpayer would exercise her right
of re-entry was not so remote as to be negligible. 42
Regarding the income tax charitable deduction, neither the courts
nor the IRS has articulated a precise standard for deciding whether a con-
tingency is so remote as to be negligible. Considering the similar language
in the estate tax regulations,' however, the IRS has consistently stated
that a probability of less than five percent will be disregarded.14 The five
percent rule is also supported by analogy to two estate tax statutes, I.R.C.
§§ 2037 and 2042.14" Section 2037(a)(2) includes in a decedent's gross
estate the value of any property in which the decedent possessed a rever-
sionary interest, but only if the value of the reversionary interest exceeds
five percent of the total value of the property.'46 Similarly, § 2042(2)
116 Id. at 651.
13 7 Id. at 656-57. The IRS argued in the alternative that the deduction should be denied
under Treasury Regulation § 1. 170A-7(a)(3). The court stated that the deduction would
be disallowed under either. Id. at 659 n.6; see also supra note 116.




142 Id. at 657-59.
14 Compare Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b), with Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(e).
'
4 See Rev. Rul. 85-23, 1985-1 C.B. 327, 328; Rev. Rul. 78-255, 1978-1 C.B. 294, 294; Rev.
Rul. 77-374, 1977-2 C.B. 329, 331; Rev. Rul. 70-452, 1970-2 C.B. 199, 199.
145 See also Treas. Reg. § 26.2612-1(d)(2)(ii) (using the five percent threshold to determine
whether a trust is a skip-person trust for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes).
141 I.R.C. § 2037(a)(2).
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requires inclusion in the gross estate of the value of any life insurance
policy in which the decedent possessed a reversionary interest, subject
to the same five percent rule. 4 ' Although there are no binding decisions
indicating that a probability of less than five percent will be disregarded
for a charitable deduction from income tax, the IRS has recently cited
this rule with favor. 148
Should the IRS or the courts extend the five percent rule to §
170(f)(3)(A), then the relevant inquiry turns to a consideration of factors
that might be used in reducing the remote contingencies to a probability. 149
This is essentially a question of fact that must be done on a case-by-case
basis. In the context of rail-trail deductions, however, the IRS has stated
that the probability is to be determined based on four factors.150 As a recent
IRS Technical Advice Memorandum ("TAM")151 states:
The case law looks to specific factors to determine the likeli-
hood of the contribution being defeated: (A) whether the
donor and donee intend at the time of the donation to cause
the event's occurrence, (B) the incidence of the event's occur-
ring in the past, (C) the extent to which the occurrence of
the event would defeat the donation, and (D) whether the
taxpayer has control over the event's occurrence.'52
Although no court has considered these factors expressly, each has been
considered, at least in some permutation, in a case or two on point. 53
147 Id. § 2042(2).
4 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
149 Id.
150 Id.
51A TAM is the medium through which the IRS Office of General Counsel communicates
its position on contentious points of law to its field agents. Until a case is officially docketed,
taxpayer information remains confidential. We interpret the TAM to signify that actual
disputes may be forthcoming, but at this time specific audit information (and the grounds
of the audit) are confidential.
152 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
" The TAM is a bit misleading. In our research, we have found no case law that precisely
points to these factors collectively, nor any individual factor expressly stated as such.
Several cases make a general inquiry into all facts and circumstances. See United States
v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1955) (stating that cases must be decided using best
judgment of relevant factors); Hamilton Nat'l Bank of Chattanooga v. United States, 236
F. Supp. 1005, 1016 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (admitting all evidence relevant to factual determi-
nation); Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 792, 793-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(instructing the jury to consider age, general physical condition, physical capacity to bear
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Regardless of the legal authority for these factors, they are certainly
relevant and reasonable criteria with which to assess the probability of
divestment.
III. CONFRONTING THE PARTIAL INTEREST RULE IN RAIL-TRAIL
CONVERSIONS
The availability of charitable deductions for rails-to-trails donations
provides a strong incentive for donation and, given the public policies favor-
ing railbanking, permitting the railroads the deduction for the donation
ofrailbanked corridors would seem a logical fit with transportation policy
objectives. The IRS's current stance-that the right to re-enter jeopardizes
the legitimacy of the deduction-could thwart these public policy goals. The
disallowance of the deduction will surely provide a disincentive for rail-
roads to railbank or to donate corridors for interim trail use. Allowing the
deduction also entails the risk that railroads will take very large deduc-
tions only to exercise their rights of re-entry in the not-too-distant future.
Whether such actions would be in good or bad faith is of little concern to
the IRS, which is charged with safeguarding the equally important public
policy of permitting a charitable deduction only in cases where a taxpayer
has made a bona fide transfer to a charity in accordance with the letter of
the law."' Recently the IRS began to question the railroads on this issue.
A recent TAM demonstrates the IRS's evaluation of the availability of
the deduction.'55 We think this TAM foreshadows a dispute that is likely
to arise over the next few years, as the IRS more aggressively challenges
children, statistical evidence, and expert testimony to decide probability of birth by
potential mother); Estate of De Foucaucourtv. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 485,493 (1974) (consider-
ing facts and circumstance of decedent's health and mental capacity).
Although not expressly stated, each factor does seem to have been considered to
some extent in the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible jurisprudence. On factor (A), see Estate
of Harvey v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 1268, 1273 (E.D. La. 1988). On factor (B), see
Bankers Trust, 191 F. Supp. at 794-95 (considering past incidents of forty-seven-year-old
women giving birth). On factor (C), see Estate of Greene v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 205,209 (1948)
(giving some weight to the fact that exercise of invasion power by trustee in favor of life
beneficiary was likely to deplete the corpus). On factor (D), see Estate of Moffett v. Comm'r,
269 F.2d 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1959) (recognizing that pure actuarial statistics cannot account
for voluntary acts); Bankers Trust, 191 F. Supp. at 795 (noting volitional element in
decision to conceive); cf Stark v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 243, 246 (1986); Rev. Rul. 76-331,
1976-2 C.B. 52, 53.
'" See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
155 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006). See the discussion of TAMs supra
note 151.
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railroads that claim the deduction. In the TAM, the IRS briefly consid-
ered three arguments that the railroads ostensibly advanced during IRS
examination:. 6 a deduction as a matter of law, the insubstantiality rule,
and the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible doctrine.'57 The IRS rejected the first
two arguments and left the third to further fact finding. 5 ' We develop
and evaluate each argument in turn, noting that although the reasoning
in the TAM is generally correct, it is not developed thoroughly enough to
lend meaningful guidance to the relevant parties in structuring future
railbanking transactions.
A. Charitable Deduction as a Matter of Law
First, in what was a rather novel yet misguided argument, the
railroads apparently asserted that they were entitled to the deduction as
matter of law.1" 9 The roots of this argument begin in 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k), 160
a section of the National Trails System Act that Congress enacted to pro-
mote charitable deductions for donations of land to the national trails
system.161 It provides that donors may transfer their property interests "to
qualified organizations consistent with section 170(h)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. "162 Section 170(h) makes a charitable deduction
available for a "qualified conservation contribution," that might otherwise
be excluded under the partial interest rule." Because the partial interest
rule would normally disqualify some conservation donations, like conser-
vation easements or donations of development rights, the I.R.C. contains
a statutory exception to the partial interest rule for "qualified conservation
contribution [s]." 1" The requirements of a qualified conservation con-
tribution are set forth in § 170(h), a rather technical section of the code.
In line with its overriding objective of promoting conservation, this pro-
vision creates an exception to the partial interest rule for donations to a
156 The TAM raises three issues and we assume that they represent claims asserted by
actual railroads in negotiations or audits with the IRS.








16 I.R.C. § 170(h).
1
6 Id. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii).
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conservation group of a conservation easement or remainder interest in
preserved land."5
With this in mind, a conservation contribution must satisfy three
requirements spelled out in § 170(h)(1) to be "qualified" for purposes of
§ 170(f)(3)(B)(iii). 166 First, the contribution must be "to a qualified organi-
zation."'67 The use of a charitable organization typically makes this the
easiest requirement to satisfy. The organization simply must qualify as a
charitable organization under § 170(b)(1)(A), 68 which generally includes
any organization designed to advance a religious, charitable, humani-
tarian, scientific, or educational purpose. 69 With this first requirement,
railroads would have little problem. As conservation groups or local govern-
ments are the interim trail users of choice, the donee is almost always a
qualified organization for purposes of § 170(h). 7 °
The second requirement is that the contribution be made "exclu-
sively for conservation purposes."' 7 ' Section 170(h)(4) recognizes four
conservation purposes: the preservation of land for public recreation and
education,'72 the protection of natural habitats and wildlife, 73 the preser-
vation of open space that yields a significant public benefit for scenic enjoy-
ment or pursuant to a governmental conservation policy, 74 and historic
preservation. 17 Despite these seemingly clear definitions, whether a con-
tribution is made for a conservation purpose is often a difficult question
to resolve and increasingly the subject of litigation between taxpayers
and the IRS.176 Thanks to 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k), however, donations to the
165 See id. § 170(h)(2)-(3).
166 See id. § 170(f)(3)(b)(iii), (h)(1).
167 Id. § 170(h)(1)(B).
'6 Id. § 170(h)(3).
169 Id. §§ 170(b)(1)(A), 501(c)(3) (2000).
170 A qualified trail provider includes any "[s] tate, political subdivision, or qualified private
organization." 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000); 49 C.F.R. § 115.29(a) (2007). Although there is
technically no prohibition on a for-profit organization serving as a qualified trail provider,
the donees are almost always charitable or governmental. See Rails-to-Trails Conservancy,
TraiIDART (Development Assistance Response Team), httpJ/www.railtrails.org/whatwedo/
trailbuilding/technicalassistance/trailDART.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2008) (reporting
fourteen projects on which TrailDART assisted, of which only two included for-profit
organizations as clients).
171 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(C).
172 Id. § 170(h)(4)(A)(I).
173 Id. § 170(h)(4)(A)(ii).
174 Id. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii).
175 Id. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv).
176 See Turner v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 299 (2006); Glass v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 258 (2005), affd,
471 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006); Ney v. Comm'r T.C. Summ. Op. 2006-154 (2006); Strasburg
611
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
national trails system are deemed to satisfy the second requirement. 7
Section 1246(k) essentially functions as a safe harbor for the requirement
under I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(C) and § 170(h)(4) that the contribution be made
exclusively for conservation purposes. Section 1246(k) deems donations of
property to the National Trails System to "further a Federal conservation
policy" and "yield a significant public benefit."17 Accordingly, by statute, rail-
trail conversions advance a conservation purpose under § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii)
by preserving open space for interim trail use. '79 But, there is an obvious
discord in this safe harbor provision. Railroads that railbank their corri-
dors with the stated intention of keeping open their options to reactivate
seem to operate in a manner contradictory to the conservation goals of the
NTSA. The interim trail use may fit the conservation purpose, but reacti-
vating rail services probably does not. In many respects, the provision in
§ 1246(k) that encourages donations to the trails system is not carefully
crafted enough to deal with the rail reactivation justification behind the
railbanking statute. This imprecision in the act once again reveals how
the dual purpose of the railbanking act-railroad preservation and trail
use-conflict in ways that do not provide easy solutions.
The third requirement is that the property interest transferred
must be a "qualified real property interest."' ° If the donor grants its
entire interest in the property, a remainder interest, or a restriction in
perpetuity on the use of the property, then the contribution will be of a
qualified real property interest.' 1 In this respect, 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) fails
to go far enough for the railroads, as they cannot satisfy the requirement
that the donated interest constitute a qualified real property interest.
The railroads do not donate remainder interests, nor do they grant per-
petual conservation easements. Instead, they grant the present possessory
rights and retain a reversionary interest that could be of much longer dura-
tion than the present estate. Accordingly, the property interest that the
railroads grant does not constitute a qualified conservation contribu-
tion.'82 Conservation implies that land will be restricted in the future;8 3
v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697 (2000); Schwab v. Comm'r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3004 (1994);
Satullo v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697 (1993), affd, 67 F.3d 314 (11th Cir. 1995);
Stotler v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 973 (1987).
177 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
178 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) (2000).
'
7 9 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
180 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(A).
1811d. § 170(h)(2).
1
8 2 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
'
83I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) ("A contribution shall not be treated as exclusively for conservation
purposes unless the conservation purpose is protected in perpetuity." (emphasis added)).
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railbanking operates to restrict the land now but possibly remove the
restrictions in the future. Because the railroads must retain some interest
in the railbanked corridors, no railbanked rail-trail conversion can satisfy
the narrow requirement of I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(A).
Nonetheless, it appears from the recent TAM that the railroads
might argue, despite the requirements of I.R.C. § 170(h), that 16 U.S.C.
§ 1246(k) entitles them to a deduction as a matter of law.l" The IRS has re-
fused this claim in requiring that, irrespective of the language of§ 1246(k),
rail-trail conversions must satisfy the requirements of I.R.C. § 170 to
qualify for a charitable deduction.' The IRS dismissed the argument with
little discussion, but the issues of statutory construction and legislative
intent are worth further consideration.
If pressed on the issue, the IRS would presumably rely on the oft-
cited rule that tax deductions, charitable or otherwise, are a matter of leg-
islative grace."' The Tax Court has repeatedly interpreted this as a rule
of statutory construction, which has been applied to require a narrow
construction of tax statutes permitting deductions.8 7 This means that the
burden rests on the taxpayer to demonstrate that the taxpayer's claim for
a deduction falls plainly within the statute that creates the deduction.
With the application of this rule of law requiring the railroads to demon-
strate that the contribution comes within the statutory provisions of§ 170,
the stipulations in 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) clearly are insufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the charitable deduction statute. Although the impli-
cations of legislative grace and statutory construction may compel a dis-
qualification of these deductions, such an outcome is contrary to the intent
of the Trails Act.'
4 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2008).
185Id.
186 As the Supreme Court stated in New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v. Helvering, "The power
to tax income ... is plain and extends to the gross income. Whether and to what extent
deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear pro-
vision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed." 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). See also
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Comm'r v. Nat'l Alfalfa Dehydrating
& Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974); McDonald v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 57, 60 (1944);
Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S.
488, 493 (1940); White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938).
187 See Kovner v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 893, 906 (1990); Stark v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 243, 252
(1986); Byrne v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 473, 479 (1975). All of the tax court cases rely, at least
indirectly, upon New Colonial Ice, which clearly states that deductions are a matter of
legislative grace but does not go so far as to expressly require a narrow construction. See
292 U.S. at 440.
' See H.R. REP. NO. 98-28, at 8 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 112, 119 (stating
that subsection (k) was added to encourage conveyance).
613
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
I Because 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) specifically contemplates a charitable
deduction for donations of property for use in the national trails system,
then reading broad tax statutes as prohibiting the deduction seems to
allow a general statute to prevail over a specific one. What's worse, nullify-
ing through the partial interest rule the application of § 1246(k) to rail-
trail conversions renders the major application of § 1246(k) moot, and
courts might reasonably presume that Congress did not intend for such
a consequence. Yet, it is important to note that § 1246(k) does not specif-
ically state that donations of property interests for trail purposes should
automatically qualify for charitable deductions or that railbanked corridors
automatically qualify; instead, it simply creates the statutory safe harbor
for I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)." 9 To impute a meaning that is not present from the
plain reading of an unambiguous statute might take statutory construction
a step too far. Furthermore, 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) is not aimed specifically
at railroads, but rather at a general class of "landowners" who might feel
compelled to donate their property. 9 ° Although the partial interest rule
wipes out the major application of § 1246(k), it is entirely possible that
the statute might be applied in other circumstances where the donor in
question is not a railroad. As such, the statute is not wholly meaningless,
and its failure to expressly provide the deduction probably renders it in-
sufficient to overcome the strict application of the tax code.
If the tension in statutory construction was not enough, there is
also the issue of legislative history. The legislative history of 16 U.S.C.
§ 1246(k) probably supports narrow application in view of I.R.C. § 170(h),
yet ambiguous language contained in the legislative reports does little to
resolve the debate. The House Report and the Senate Report contain iden-
tical language regarding the intent behind 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k).' 9 ' On the
189 See 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) (2000); I.R.C. § 170(h)(4).
190 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k).
"9 The reports state as follows:
[Section 1246(k)] is added to encourage the donation and conveyance
of land and easements by utilizing federal laws allowing for various tax
benefits for such conveyances. This provision could be most advantageous
in facilitating trail access and protection of rural landscapes in areas
where the federal government is not actively involved in the acquisition
of lands or the management of trails, and thereby encourages private
sector initiatives in these endeavors.... This provision does not change
existing tax law or regulations, but is intended to better define the types
of interests in land that qualify under existing law when related to trail
purposes. The Committee's intent is that easements donated pursuant
to this provision shall have the same tax benefits to the donor as pro-
vided in [§ 170(h)].
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one hand, the statute was not intended to "change existing tax law or
regulations. "192 On the other, the intention was that the donors would
have "the same tax benefits" as provided in I.R.C. § 170(h), and the reports
stress Congress's desire to encourage donation of property to the trails
system.193 We are left to wonder whether Congress intended for the rail-
road to have to pass through the technicalities of § 170(h) to avoid the
partial interest rule, or whether it intended 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) to pave
a yellow-brick road. We are left wondering all the more in light of the fact
that it was the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, not the Senate
Finance Committee nor the House Ways and Means Committee, that
drafted 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) to interact with a rather technical provision
of the I.R.C. 94
Regardless of congressional intent, if the railroads fail to qualify
under I.R.C. § 170(h), the result could be a complete denial of the chari-
table deduction. As noted above, the partial interest rule is an all-or-
nothing one-either the railroads may deduct the full fair market value
of the donated property or they may deduct nothing.'95 As we discuss below,
Congress could certainly amend 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) or I.R.C. § 170(h) to
resolve the tension between the two statutes.196 In the absence of some
kind of reconciliation, however, the statutoryjustification for the deduction
seems weak at best. This leaves the railroads with the task of confronting
the partial interest rule head on, rather than relying on the provisions
for qualified conservation contributions in the NTSA. To do so, they must
turn to the insubstantiality rule and the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible
doctrine.
B. Application of the Insubstantiality Rule
The second argument the TAM addresses is whether the interest
retained under the railbanking statute is insubstantial.'97 The railroads
are unlikely to prevail on this basis for a number of reasons. First, a right
to re-enter and reacquire uniquely situated and potentially valuable land
H. REP. No. 98-28, at 8; S. REP. No. 98-1, at 9 (1983).
192 H. REP. No. 98-28, at 8.
193Id.
,
94 Id. at 1; S. REP. No. 98-1, at 1.
19' See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
19' See infra Part IV.
197 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
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at the donor's sole discretion and without cost is clearly a significant
power. This right has significant value to the extent railroads fashion
their railbanking and trail use agreements to allow them to determine
when the market conditions favor reactivation and whether they have to
pay to re-enter. Moreover, the right to determine or effectuate the forfei-
ture is often considered a more robust property right than an "incident of
ownership." Although the railroads are somewhat at the whim of market
forces, which certainly can dramatically limit their discretion, the interim
trail user has virtually no power to deny a railroad the right to reclaim
its corridor land. Even if the market conditions are unlikely to occur, the
power to reclaim the land at will is clearly not insubstantial.
This fact is evident from a recent reactivation decision by the STB
that sent shock waves throughout the rail-trail community when a rail-
road in Georgia sought to reactivate rail service and vacate the NITU that
allowed for interim trail use.198 The STB in that case addressed two impor-
tant questions: 1) whether the railroad may reactivate on the line, and;
2) whether the interim trail sponsor was entitled to compensation as a
precondition to the reactivation.'99 In answer to the first question, the STB
explained that
an interim trail use arrangement is subject to being cut off
at any time by the reinstitution of rail service. If and when
the railroad wishes to restore rail service on all or part of
the property, it has the right to do so, and the trail user
must step aside. °°
In addressing the second question, the trail sponsor argued that
the railroad should have to pay compensation, in part because it had
taken a charitable deduction when it donated the roadway.2 ' The STB,
without addressing the tax deduction portion of the trail sponsor's argu-
ment, denied compensation on the ground that its role in trail use agree-
ments is purely ministerial, and that issues of compensation properly
belong in the negotiations and contracts between the railroad and the trail
.
9 Ga. Great S. Div., S.C. Cent. R.R. Co., Inc., Abandonment & Discontinuance Exemption
Between Albany & Dawson in Terrell, Lee, & Dawson Counties, Ga., Docket No. AB-389
(Sub-No. 1X), 2003 WL 21132515 (STB May 9, 2003). For an explanation of NITU and
CITU, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
... Ga. Great S. Div., 2003 WL 21132515, at *2-*4.200 Id. at *3 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(2)-(3)).
201 Id. at *4.
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sponsor.2 °2 If the trail sponsor fails to insist on a right to compensation
in the trail use agreement, the STB certainly will not imply one. This is
true even if the trail sponsor has purchased the right-of-way from the rail-
road.2 3 Although the parties involved eventually negotiated to reactivate
only a portion of the line, keeping the rest for a trail, the STB ruling is im-
portant. Many railroads and trail sponsors did not believe that reactivation
was likely in many instances, so they did not provide for compensation
or impose any restrictions on the railroads in the off chance they chose
to reactivate. We believe it is safe to say that trail use agreements made
after May, 2005 probably provide for compensation.
Nonetheless, the STB is the only entity that examines the appro-
priateness of rail service reactivation, and it has expressly stated that its
role is ministerial:
No authority under [49 U.S.C. 109011 is required to reacti-
vate rail service where, as here, the carrier who would have
been the abandoning railroad had there not been rail bank-
ing and interim trail use, or its successor, is the one who
decides to restore active rail service. Because it could have
performed the operations without seeking any additional
regulatory approval prior to the interim trail use, the re-
sumption of service by the same carrier or its successor
does not trigger the licensing requirement of section 10901,
or require that its successor in interest seek concurrences
from any other carrier.20 4
The utter lack of oversight means that the railroad has the full and sole
discretion to decide whether to reactivate and trigger the re-entry provision.
This power would clearly constitute a substantial retained interest.
In addition to there being no real oversight on the decision to
reactivate, the only limitation on that power is economic and not legal.
Although the railroads and trail sponsors have clearly negotiated their
trail use agreements in the belief that there is little likelihood of reacti-
vation, their subjective belief is not the issue. When the Supreme Court
determined that the NTSA was a permissible exercise of interstate com-
merce in the Preseault decision, Justice Brennan rejected the adjacent
202 Id. at *4-*5.
203 Id. at *5.
o Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
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landowner's argument that the right of re-entry is a sham.2 °5 In noting
that "Congress apparently believed that every line is a potentially valu-
able national asset that merits preservation even if no future rail use for
it is currently foreseeable,"2 °6 the Court found that rail corridor preserva-
tion was a valid legislative goal. It also held that the fact that "the ICC
must certify that public convenience and necessity permit abandonment
before granting a CITU or NITU does not indicate that the statute fails to
promote its purpose of preserving rail corridors."207 Hence, the recognition
of the importance of rail preservation in determining the constitutionality
of the railbanking statute indicates that even if corridors are rarely reacti-
vated, the power to do so is at the heart of the policy. We cannot ignore
the central motivating logic behind the railbanking policy as though it is
an insubstantial interest.
The importance of this re-entry right to the entire railbanking and
rail preservation program means that even if the odds of reactivation are
negligible, and the economic factors are outside the railroads' control, the
property right itself is so central to the entire scheme that it simply cannot
be considered insubstantial. Although few railroads have in fact reacti-
vated,28 the right of re-entry is crucial to the rail preservation policy of
the federal government.2 9 But it is in this sense that the insubstantiality
rule and the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible doctrine diverge. The insubstan-
tiality rule looks merely to the substance of the retained interest, ignoring
the probability of divestment. It is precisely this probability, however,
that factors into the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible doctrine, which does
offer some hope to railroads seeking to navigate the pitfalls of the partial
interest rule.
C. Application of the So-Remote-as-to-be-Negligible Doctrine
The third argument raised in the TAM concerns the so-remote-as-
to-be-negligible doctrine and provides the greatest likelihood of success
for the railroads under the current state of the law.210 As the IRS stated in
the TAM, it will consider four factors to determine whether the probability
of a railroad exercising its right of re-entry to divest the interim trail user




' See supra note 34.
209 H.R. REP. No. 98-28, at 8 (1983).
210 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
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is so-remote-as-to-be-negligible.21' This argument is most beneficial to the
railroads because the inquiry into each factor is highly fact dependent. In
addressing each factor, we consider the factual scenarios as they generally
exist and propose strategies that railroads might take to use each factor
in its favor. By effectively understanding each factor, railroads can create
more effective railbanking grants that bring to light the bona fide nature
of the transactions.
1. The Intent of the Railroad and Interim Trail Sponsors
First, the IRS will attempt to ascertain whether, at the time of the
donation, the donor and donee intend for the divesting event to occur.21 2
It is clear that in the vast majority of trail use agreements, there is no
foreseeable intent to reactivate. This is supported by the fact that few
trail sponsors thought to include a compensation element in the event
that a railroad reactivates. Hence, the trail sponsor in the Georgia Great
Souther Division Railroad reactivation in Georgia had to argue to the
STB that it was entitled to compensation precisely because the parties
had not included a better provision in their contract for how they would
deal with a reactivation.213 Not surprisingly, few trail use agreements be-
fore 2005 made adequate provisions for reactivation. Although on the one
hand this seems to be manifestly contrary to common sense, it certainly
did reflect the true belief of the parties that reactivation was unlikely, at
least in the near future.
There is something rather perverse, however, in basing a charitable
deduction on what is essentially bad legal drafting. And now that the STB
has ruled that the railroad has the unilateral right to reactivate without
consideration for the trail use agreement, trail sponsors from 2005 on
have been diligent in including provisions for dealing with reactivation.
The presence or absence of a compensation provision, however, should not
be the determining factor in qualifying for the deduction. There should
be some more uniform and rational understanding of the role of rail pre-
servation and reactivation in the railbanking and interim trail use pro-
cess. When the Preseaults argued before the Supreme court that the rail
211 id.
212 Id.
211 Ga. Great S. Div., S.C. Cent. R.R. Co., Inc., Abandonment & Discontinuance Exemption
Between Albany & Dawson in Terrell, Lee, & Dawson Counties, Ga., Docket No. AB-389
(Sub-No. 1X), 2003 WL 21132515 (STB May 9, 2003).
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preservation purpose was a sham, and that the underlying purpose of the
railbanking statute was merely to create trails, the Court dismissed the
argument under a relatively deferential statement that Congress could
easily have intended both goals: new trails and rail preservation.214 But
underlying the Preseaults' argument is the fact that they are ultimately
contradictory goals to the extent that a trail has to give way if a rail line
is to be reactivated.215 Of course, temporary trails are better than nothing:
Congress accomplishes both goals to the extent that the railbanking stat-
ute allows interim trail use while preserving the corridor.216 In light of the
power to reactivate and potentially destroy the trail, however, the long-
term policy is clearly to preserve transportation infrastructure, which is
arguably not an environmental or conservation purpose and thus may
not be charitable.1 7
So what is the intent of the parties and, more importantly, how is
that intent evaluated? In the context of the charitable deduction, the law
remains ambiguous as to whether the subjective or objective intent of the
parties controls in determining the validity of the contribution. 28 Nonethe-
less, there has been a recent trend toward a more objective approach.219
214Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 19 (1989).
215 For an example of how these two goals can coexist, see infra Part III.C.3 (discussing
"rails with trails").216 See 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) (2000).
217 See I.R.C. § 170(h) (requiring that deductions be made for charitable purposes and
serve a conservation goal).2' The tax law definition of a gift as that coming from "detached and disinterested gener-
osity" originated in Duberstein v. Comm'r, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) in regards to I.R.C.
§ 102. Courts have struggled in applying this standard as either a subjective or objective
test in regards to I.R.C. § 170. For cases that seem to apply a subjective test, see Winters
v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJongv. Comm'r, 309 F.2d 373,377-78 (9th Cir.
1962). For cases that seem to apply an objective test, see Christiansen v. Comm'r, 843
F.2d 418,420 (10th Cir. 1988); Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500,502 (4th Cir. 1987); Graham v.
Comm'r, 822 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1987); Oppewal v. United States, 468 F.2d 1000,
1002 (1st Cir. 1972); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 423 (Ct. Cl. 1971). In its
most recent opinion on the issue, the Supreme Court seems to have skirted the issue. See
Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (determining deduction on basis of quid pro
quo); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts'--The Income Tax
Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable "Gifts"and a Principled Justification
for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 441, 496-512 (2003).
29 See supra note 218. This fact is also supported by the enactment of I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)
under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13173(a), 107
Stat. 312,456. This section sets forth substantiation requirements for any contribution in
excess of $250, which direct the charitable organization to provide an acknowledgment of
the amount of cash and a description of the property received, whether the donee provided
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Thus, while it is clear that the actual subjective intent of the parties in the
overwhelming number of cases is that there is no likelihood of reactivation,
we are left to inquire into what a more objective intent would be between
parties who are presumed to know at the outset what the eventual outcome
could be. In this sense, an objective approach asks what a reasonable rail-
road and trail sponsor would likely intend if they knew that reactivation
was going to occur. If reactivation were looming large over the transaction,
the trail use agreement would most likely contain a compensation element,
because no trail sponsor wants to spend millions of dollars converting an
old railroad bed into a recreational trail only to have it all torn up and
reconverted to rails a few years after it opened.22 °
Accordingly, because a railroad's obligation to compensate interim
trail users in the event of reactivation would be the likely intent of the
parties, the right to re-enter would become more costly and reactivation
would be less likely to occur. This may seem like a rather convoluted way
to deal with what should be a relatively straightforward issue, but it once
again shows how the tension between the trail use and the rail preservation
goals collide. Railroads should meet the intent element, whether the IRS
adopts an objective or subjective intent standard: either the parties did not
form the subjective intent to reactivate, or, had they objectively thought
about it, they would have included a compensation element which would
naturally decrease the likelihood that reactivation would occur.
Additionally, railbanking agreements should expressly state the
parties' intent to make a bona fide charitable contribution while still pre-
serving the potential for reactivation in relatively narrow circumstances.
Stating the narrow circumstances that would motivate a railroad to reacti-
vate will demonstrate that in the overwhelming number of circumstances,
interim trail use, corridor preservation, and charitable intent can coexist."'
any goods or services in return, and a good faith estimate of any goods or services if so
provided. I.R.C. § 170(f(8). Although this statute speaks more to valuation, congressional
intent seems to favor a more objective evaluation. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 218, at
510.220 See generally KAREN-LEE RYAN & JULIE WINTERICH, RAILS-TO-TAILS CONSERVANCY &
NAT'L PARK SERV., SECRETS OF SUCCESSFUL RAIL-TRAILS: AN ACQUISrITON AND ORGANIZING
MANUAL FOR CONVERTING RAILS INTO TRAILS, available at http://www.railtrails.org/
resources/documents/resource_docs/tgc-secrets.pdf (discussing the extensive financial
resources and planning needed to build a rail-trail).
221 Furthermore, including the narrow circumstances under which the railroad might
reactivate as conditions precedent in the agreement reduces the likelihood of reactivation
and provides independent considerations that diminish the ability of the railroad to act
unilaterally. Drafting in this manner is important, as discussed infra Part IV.
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Thus, regardless of whether a compensation element is included in the
trail use agreements, better drafting of the intent element should place
the transaction on the more remote side of the spectrum.
2. The Incidence of Past Reactivation
Under the second factor, the IRS will consider the incidence of the
divesting event having occurred in the past.222 As noted above, only five
railroads have sought to reactivate after railbanking their corridors.22
The total mileage of those five is less than two percent of the sum total of
miles in the rail bank.224 Despite the infrequency, railroads and the IRS
would do well to recognize that certain factors might lead to a greater
likelihood of reactivation, though we feel that no factor seems to be con-
clusive. One could reasonably argue that nearly any corridor along the
heavily-trafficked Washington, DC-Boston corridor is a likely culprit for
reactivation. As population and automobile pressures increase and the
finite amount of land prevents building new roads, the attractiveness of
reactivating rail lines may increase. Similarly, planners in some of the
high-growth areas of the country around rapidly expanding urban areas
(Phoenix, San Diego, Houston, Atlanta) may eye discontinued rail corridors
as new avenues to open commuter rail lines.22 5
As of yet, however, the corridors that have been reactivated are not
in heavily trafficked areas. The first reactivation concerned reconstruction
of a 1.8 mile segment of an abandoned corridor in Council Bluffs, Iowa
to provide a more direct route for hauling coal to the Iowa Power Council
Bluffs Energy Center.226 The second reactivation involved a 9.1 mile cor-
ridor between St. Mary's and Minster, in rural Auglaize County, Ohio.227
222 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
223 See supra note 34.
224 Fewer than 80 miles of railbanked corridor have had their NITU/CITU vacated for
reactivation out of a total of 4,431 miles in the railbank. See infra notes 226-235; Rails-
to-Trails Conservancy, What is Railbanking?, http://www.railtrails.org/whatwedo/trail
advocacy/railbanking.html (last visited Mar. 25,2008); National Trails Training Partnership,
Reactivated Railbanked Corridors: Rail Trails Returned to Railroad Service, http://www
.americantrails.org/resources/railtrails/rerail04.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2008) (summa-
rizing the reasons for each reactivation).22 See John Spychalski, Rail Transport: Retreat and Resurgence, 553 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. Sci. 42, 50 (1997).
226 Iowa Power, Inc., Constr. Exemption in Council Bluffs, Iowa, 8 I.C.C.2d 858 (1990).
227 Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., Abandonment Between St. Marys & Minister in Auglaize
County, Ohio, 9 I.C.C.2d 1015 (1993).
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In that case, the STB explained that a rail carrier that banks its corridor
has retained "its common carrier obligation."22' The Board explained:
By consenting to the issuance of a CITU/NITU, a carrier
agrees to forgo consummating the authorized or exempted
abandonment. As a consequence, its common carrier obli-
gation does not terminate. Instead, the abandoning carrier
retains a residual common carrier obligation and transfers
the right-of-way to the trail user, subject to the stipulation
that the rail corridor remain available for the reinstitution
of rail service....
The right to reinstitute rail service is a common
carrier interest that did not exist prior to the Trails Act.
Notwithstanding any understanding or agreement between
the abandoning carrier and the trail user, this right does not
transfer to the trail user without our explicit approval.229
The language of the STB in this case indicates that the continuation of the
common carrier duties is the legal obligation retained by the railroads, and
that the ability to meet that obligation on the transferred corridor is a
mere corollary to that obligation.
The third reactivation involved only 1100 feet of a Union Pacific
corridor to allow it to extend track to an active shipper.23 ° Union Pacific
claimed that it needed the additional track beyond its current switch "to
allow for adequate 'tail' room to spot rail cars at the shipper's facilities."231
This 1100 feet was located in the metropolitan St. Louis area but was
closely connected to an already active Union Pacific line.232 The fourth re-
activation, the Georgia Great Southern Division Railroad line, was for
13.62 miles between Albany and Sasser, Georgia.233 The motivation for
the reactivation was that the Georgia Southwestern Railroad had to use
trackage rights of Norfolk Southern, which it claimed was financially
228 Id. at 1018.
229 Id. (citations omitted).
230 Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., Abandonment Exemption in St. Louis County, Mo., Docket No. AB-3
(Sub-No. 98X), 1997 WL 201480 (STB Apr. 18, 1997).
231 Id.
232 id.
1 3 Ga. Great S. Div., S.C. Cent. R.R. Co., Inc., Abandonment & Discontinuance Exemption
Between Albany & Dawson in Terrell, Lee, & Dawson Counties, Ga., Docket No. AB-389
(Sub-No. lX), 2003 WL 21132515 (STB May 9, 2003).
623
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
detrimental and inefficient.234 The final reactivation involved a 52 mile
rural corridor between Spalding and Grangeville, Idaho where the railroad
asserted there were two major grain shippers interested in reactivating
the corridor for use during peak grain traffic season.235
What these diverse reactivations indicate is that less than two
percent of the total railbanked mileage has been reactivated in twenty
years of railbanking. Notably, some of the most profitable land (that in
urban corridors) is not what is being reactivated. Some reactivations may
be motivated by anti-trail animus and reactivators may exaggerate the
demands of shippers in order to defeat a potential trail. The Georgia line
shows what happens when railroads abandon lines thinking they can use
trackage rights of other carriers and then find their trains at the end of
the waiting list for access to rail yards. The St. Louis and Council Bluffs
reactivations were for very limited industrial uses that involved relatively
short segments of corridor. Thus, it is difficult to make any general state-
ments about the types of corridors that are most likely to be reactivated.
One can generalize, however, that if a railroad has to compensate the
trail owner for the value of the corridor when it does choose to reactivate,
that the more expensive urban routes will be reactivated only when the
economic conditions justify the expensive rehabilitation.
Looking at other factors that might tend to increase the likelihood
of reactivation appears to be fruitless. Although one would think that
urban areas are more likely to be reactivated because of heavier traffic
(both rail and automobile), the majority of the actual reactivations were
in rural areas.236 One might suppose that areas involving heavy grain pro-
duction or coal production, products that are usually shipped on railroads,
would be more likely to see reactivations. However, those areas have
actually seen fewer abandonments precisely because those shippers have
continuously been using rail services.131 It seems logical that the places
most likely to see reactivations are rapidly growing urban areas that saw
interconnected highways and interstates displace passenger rails with the
rise of the suburban automobile commuter. However, railbanking pursu-
ant to STB procedures only applies to corridors used for freight rail lines,
2 Id. at *2.235 BG & CM R.R., Inc., Exemption from 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Finance Docket No. 34399,
2003 WL 22379168 (STB Oct. 17, 2003).
236 See supra note 224.
17 See Spychalski, supra note 225, at 52 (noting that the government made a great effort
to keep railways running where they were "considered indispensable by coal, automotive,
steel, chemical, lumber, and grain shippers").
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so former passenger rail lines are unavailable.23 Thus, most of those lines
have already been lost and would require eminent domain or voluntary
sales to reestablish them.
The lines that were abandoned in the late 1980s and 1990s, and
were hence available for railbanking, tended to be duplicate shipping lines
that were consolidated with the breakup of Conrail, whose assets were
transferred to CSX and Norfolk Southern,239 or were the result of consoli-
dations and mergers by companies like Burlington Northern and Union
Pacific.24 ° These latter railroad giants were swallowing up smaller lines
throughout the 1970s and 1980s to eliminate costly competition, and then
they shed unprofitable or duplicative lines.24' Even smaller lines, like the
Camas Prairie RailNet, that resisted consolidation with the major western
carriers found that they could not compete with the main lines and simply
faded away.242 With the current national rail system relatively sleek and
efficient, limited to a handful of major carriers, the rate of abandonments
has decreased,243 indicating that we are unlikely to see a significant in-
crease in the railbank. However, the slimness of the system means that
we may see more reactivations as transportation pressures increase.2"
It remains difficult to articulate any generalized rules to predict
when reactivation is likely to occur. Although empirical analysis demon-
strates a greater likelihood of rural reactivation, theoretical predictions
based upon economics and population growth indicate that future reacti-
vation would be more likely to occur in urban areas. Irrespective of geo-
graphic location, railroads should safely rely upon, and the IRS should
recognize, the statistical realities underlying these transactions. With
238 See 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (2000).
239 Bruce Ingersoll, U.S. Approves Plan to Divide Conrail in Two, WALL ST. J., June 9,
1998, at A3.
' BNSF Railway, BNSF History, http://www.bnsf.com/aboutbnsf~history/index.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2008); Union Pacific, Chronological History, httpJ/www.uprr.com/aboutup/
history/uprr-chr.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
"' Spychalski, supra note 225, at 53 (noting that revenue increased while miles of line
owned decreased between 1980 and 1995).
2 See Kansas Rail Users Group, Watco and RailNet Announce Agreement for Sale of
Camas Prairie RailNet, DEPOT NEWS, Feb. 17, 2004, http://www.depotnews.con/KRUG/
040217KRUGa.htm.243 See SURFACE TRANSP. BD., ANNUAL REPORT 1996-1997, at 15 (1998); SURFACE TRANSP.
BD., ANNUAL REPORT 1998-2001, at 25 (2002); SURFACE TRANSP. BD., ANNUAL REPORT
2002-2004, at 26 (2005), available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/about/annual.html.244 Although only the abandoning railroad has the right to reactivate, STB procedures
allow any other railroad the right to petition, through an offer of financial assistance, to
step into the shoes of the abandoning railroad and acquire its rights to operate.
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fewer than two percent of railbanked mileage reactivated over the last
twenty years, the probability statistically lies well below the five-percent
threshold, rendering the likelihood of reactivation so remote as to be negli-
gible. And to this point we must add that as the use of railbanked corri-
dors for recreational purposes becomes more widespread, the public outcry
that would accompany destruction of a popular trail may also reduce the
likelihood of reactivation.245
3. The Extent to which Reactivation Defeats Trail Use
Third, the IRS determines the extent to which the divesting event
would defeat the donations.246 This is, in essence, an inquiry into whether
the charity is deprived of the benefit of the contribution upon the exercise
of re-entry. Although in some instances reactivation might entirely eradi-
cate any interest that the interim trail user possesses, this is not always
the case. Based on a recent trend, railroads might engage in "rails with
trails" upon reactivation. 247 And as mentioned above, railroads must con-
sider the public response to reactivation as part of their calculation of the
benefits and costs of resuming rail services. Once an interim trail has
been established on a corridor, the public outcry over destruction of the
trail is another disincentive for reactivation. Popular routes, like the Katy
Trail in Missouri and the Cowboy Trail in Nebraska,' would be staunchly
defended if the railroads sought to reactivate. Even more likely, the popu-
larity of the route would hopefully encourage negotiations over alterna-
tives that would allow the trails to remain while limited rail service was
reactivated.249 The State of Indiana recently amended its statutes that had
24 Patrick Blais, Funding for Path in Danger, THE STONEHAM INDEPENDENT (Mass.),
Aug. 6, 2003, available at http://www.stonehamindependent.com/archives/2003/08/06/2
(noting the widespread public outcry to the reduction in federal financial support for rail-
trails).
246 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
247 See RAILS-TO-TRAILS CONSERVANCY, RAILS WITH TRAILS (2000) [hereinafter RAILS WITH
TRAILS], available at http://www.railtrails.org/resources/documents/resourcedocs/Rails-
with-Trails%20Report%20reprint-1-06-lr.pdf.
24 For more information about these trails, see About Katy Trail State Park, MO,
http://www.bikekatytrail.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2008); NEBRASKA GAME AND PARKS
COMMISSION, COWBOY RECREATION AND NATURE TRAIL 2 (2006), available at http://www
.ngpc.state.ne.us/parks/pdfs/cowboytrail.pdf.249 See RAILS WITH TRAILS, supra note 247, at 12-15 (describing five successful rails with
trails arrangements).
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once forbidden rails with trails to permit them in certain circumstances. 250
This would mean that even if the railroad reactivated, the public purpose
behind the donation would remain viable as the conservation of open lands
and provision of trails could continue.
In most states, the issue of rails with trails is left to regulatory
agencies to determine the viability of any project on a case-by-case basis.
Notable among the considerations that such agencies make is the fact that
a one-hundred-foot corridor can easily accommodate one or two tracks
(four feet, eight and one-half inches being standard gauge)2 5' and still
leave half of the corridor for a ten-foot trail and appropriate buffer vege-
tation. Even if rail service is reinstated, therefore, at least some of the
conservation and trail benefits will remain. There are currently hundreds
of miles of rails with trails and the incidence of accidents is virtually nil.252
Thus, as with the other two factors noted above, the small likelihood of
reactivation and the possibility of harmonious mixed use supports the
applicability of the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible exception.
4. Railroads' Control over the Right of Re-entry
The final and most problematic consideration is the extent to which
the donor controls the divesting event.5 3 In most current trail use agree-
ments, the railroads are the sole decisionmakers regarding whether they
will re-enter and reactivate. The STB has placed some limits on that right,
however. First, only the originally abandoning railroad has the common
carrier obligation to resume rail service, and therefore only the reactivat-
ing railroad or another railroad authorized by the donor railroad has the
right to re-enter.2' This means that if a railroad does not want to reacti-
vate itself, it can keep a competitor from doing so on its old roadbed, at
least until an intervening agency determines that the public convenience
and necessity demand reactivation. Although that power is not insignifi-
cant, it does limit the possible parties likely to reactivate. The limited pool
of railroads entitled to re-activate will necessarily limit the likelihood of
reactivation.
250 1999 Ind. Legis. Serv. 158, § 15 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. § 8-4.5-6-1(c)).
251 Douglas Puffert, The Standardization of Track Gauge on North American Railways,
1830-1890, 60 J. ECON. HIST. 933, 933 (2000).
52 RAILS wITH TRAILS, supra note 247, at 5-6.
25 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
2
' Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., Abandonment Between St. Marys & Minister in Auglaize
County, Ohio, 9 I.C.C.2d 1015, 1018-19 (1993).
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Trail sponsors that had the foresight to place a compensation duty
on railroads wishing to reactivate will have established a disincentive
that may be enough to deter a railroad from reinstating rail services. But
ultimately, the decision to reactivate is in the hands of the railroad and
it will make its decision based on the market forces and economic circum-
stances of the time. 5 The STB must vacate the NITU/CITU, however,
before reactivation will be allowed, and although the STB has stated that
its oversight is somewhat limited, the Board did note that a NITU/CITU
will be vacated under only two circumstances: when the trail user requests
the vacation or when an application to construct and operate a rail line is
granted under 49 U.S.C. § 10901.256 The latter requires that reactivation
be in the public interest. Section 10901(c) states:
The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing activities
for which such authority is requested in an application
filed under subsection (b) unless the Board finds that such
activities are inconsistent with the public convenience and
necessity. Such certificate may approve the application as
filed, or with modifications, and may require compliance
with conditions (other than labor protection conditions) the
Board finds necessary in the public interest.257
Even this modest oversight provides some check against railroads unilat-
erally deciding to exercise their reactivation rights, and it could prove
meaningful in the case of a popular public trail that provides health and
recreational resources to thousands of people that is at risk of closure by
a railroad seeking reactivation to service a single shipper. Although rail
preservation and future reactivation are deemed superior rights to the
interim trail use, it is not entirely clear that all reactivations will be in
the public interest.5 8
Nonetheless, the donor's ability to defeat the interest is clearly the
strongest argument for the IRS in denying the deduction. The current
public interest test is a weak challenge to the railroads' power. Yet, rail-
roads can potentially minimize this element through careful drafting.
The railroad could allow trail groups to negotiate for tougher standards
255 See National Trails Training Partnership, supra note 224 (describing the reasons for
the five reactivations).
2" Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 9 I.C.C.2d at 1016-17.
257 49 U.S.C. § 10901(c) (2000).
2M See id.
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in the railbanking grants so that reactivation would occur only upon a
greater showing of public necessity. Although the railroads are free to struc-
ture the agreements so that they retain the right to re-enter conditioned
exclusively upon their will to do so, they are also free to create more ro-
bust prerequisites to reactivation. In fact, many of these prerequisites
are already implicit in the business decision to reactivate, so placing such
restrictions in an agreement merely gives legal effect to considerations
that already weigh into the decision.259 More importantly, placing the re-
striction in the gift agreements will, so far as the IRS may be concerned,
increase the remoteness of the contingency. By subjecting the railroads
to ascertainable standards that serve as prerequisites to reactivation, the
fourth factor can be turned in favor of the railroads that are prohibited
from reactivating corridors simply when their sole discretion supports such
a decision. There are several restrictions that the railroads could place in
the gift agreements to effectuate such restraints, such as meeting certain
market conditions, giving evidence of technological developments that
mandate reactivation, or even making the right to re-enter require com-
pensation for significant value.
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICYMAKING IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
Irrespective of the railroads' ability to structure their donations
in a manner that tips the balance of the factors below the five percent
threshold, one cannot help but recognize that the heart of the problem
truly lies with two competing public policies. The NTSA promotes health
and recreational activity, environmental conservation, and alternative
transportation venues.26° It also preserves valuable stretches of rail corri-
dors that took decades to assemble.26' The need for such corridors may
have declined with the popularity of rail transportation, but these corridors
remain a valuable national asset.262 Potential future uses support keeping
this unique assemblage of property intact. The economic benefit of this
potential value, however, remains with the railroads and their reversionary
interest, notwithstanding the fact that the retention of this interest is not
259 See National Trails Training Partnership, supra note 224 (describing the reasons for
the five reactivations).
2 National Trails System Act, Pub. L. No. 90-543, § 2(a), 82 Stat. 919, 919 (1983).
261 See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 19 (1989).
262 Id.
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entirely by choice.263 As such, the policy of ensuring that a taxpayer does
not receive a charitable deduction for the value of property to which the
taxpayer might become wholly re-entitled cannot be overlooked. But if
the fear is that taxpayers, in this case the railroads, will abuse the chari-
table deduction by having their cake and eating it too, it seems counter-
intuitive to place the availability of the deduction in an amorphous rule
that the railroads can bend in their favor. On a higher level, it seems
fundamentally undemocratic to leave the resolution of conflicting policy
objectives in the hands of a private party. Instead, legislative and adminis-
trative steps should be taken to reconcile the partial interest rule and the
railbanking statute.
The most obvious solution is the legislative one-Congress should
amend the law. Although this relatively technical imprecision in the law
is unlikely to attract broad congressional interest, two options are available.
First, Congress could amend 16 U.S.C. § 1246(k) to take the additional
step that it arguably failed to take the first time. This would require legis-
lation that would deem I.R.C. § 170(h)(2) satisfied in cases of contributions
of railbanked property to the trails system by explicitly discounting the
possibility of future rail use in the conservation purpose calculation. This
would create the safe harbor for all donations of railbanked properties
regardless of the likelihood of reactivation. Second, and more directly,
Congress could amend § 170(h)(2) to include as a qualified real property
interest the transfer of a railbanked corridor under the railbanking statute.
Either of these solutions would afford to the railroads the deduction, but
would perhaps provide an incentive to abuse the process absent federal
oversight.
Concern that a railroad might donate a corridor and claim the
deduction only to reactivate a short time later might also be addressed
statutorily. Several solutions exist. Congress could require that to be eli-
gible for a charitable deduction, any railbanking grant must include a
requirement that the trail manager is not compelled to return the corridor
unless the railroad pays current fair market value compensation to the
interim trail user as a prerequisite to reactivation. Additionally, Congress
could set forth more stringent conditions precedent to reactivation. There
is no reason to think that making it harder for the railroad to reactivate
will undermine the rail preservation goals of the railbanking laws, so long
as the terms of reactivation comport with the economic decisions the
2
" The railbanking regulations require that a railroad wanting to railbank must keep this
interest. See supra note 55.
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railroads face anyway. Thus, by building into the analysis a thoughtful
determination of the public interest, the STB can at least prevent the
vacating of NITUs and CITUs by sham entities hoping to shut down popu-
lar trails by claiming they will reinstate rail service. It will also prevent
real estate companies that obtained NITUs and CITUs with no intention
of constructing a trail from using the process as a holding mechanism to
market land to adjacent landowners.264
By imposing greater statutory criteria for reactivation, the interim
trail user would be far less vulnerable to the caprice of the railroads. If
reactivation could occur only when economic, sociological, and political
factors support such reactivation, and there was some administrative over-
sight in the determination of these factors, the ability of the railroads to
game the system would significantly decrease. Finally, and perhaps to the
chagrin of the tax code's general aversion to playing leap frog among tax
years, we see nothing wrong with forcing a railroad to include in income
the value of a previously taken deduction in the event that the railroad
reactivates.2 6'This would successfully eliminate any windfall gain to the
railroad upon reactivation and would perhaps even lend an additional
incentive to railbank.
Many of these regulatory steps might arise with greater ease
through administrative regulation, either by the promulgation of treasury
regulations by the IRS or through STB regulations that provide more than
ministerial oversight in the railbanking and reactivation process. To the
extent these measures can be taken administratively, the IRS and the STB
should act. More importantly, though perhaps idealistically, we encourage
greater cooperation between the IRS, the STB, and the National Parks
Service on this issue. If these groups worked together to devise more
cogent policies to encourage both the trail use and rail preservation goals
while offering fair and rational tax incentives, the tension between these
important policies would be resolved by the public agencies charged with
promoting them, and not by the self-serving actions of private parties
seeking to maximize their economic positions.
Even if the regulatory agencies do not work together to make
the dual goals of the railbanking statute more rational in light of the
2 See Tulare Valley R.R. Co., Abandonment & Discontinuance Exemption in Tulare &
Fresno Counties, Cal., Docket No. 397 (Sub.-No. 3X), 1996 WL 453238 (STB Aug. 13,1996).
265 This concept already exists elsewhere in the I.R.C. See I.R.C. §§ 179(d)(10), 280F(b)(2)
(requiring "recapture" of income where certain property is converted from business to
non-business use).
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permissible tax deductions, they could certainly articulate rules and stan-
dards within their own agencies that would help further the important
goals of the railbanking law. While the TAM266 was a step in the right
direction, the IRS could go further. Two steps would be relevant to all
forms of charitable giving. First, a revenue ruling or treasury regulation
extending the five percent standard to I.R.C. § 170 would be of primary
importance. Second, these same media could be utilized to promulgate a
more coherently defined set of factors that taxpayers can use to evaluate
whether a contingency is so remote as to negligible. If this issue arises on
the magnitude that we anticipate, a revenue ruling providing guidance
specifically to the railroads on when a particular railbanking donation will
be disallowed would provide the additional certainty necessary to promote
this important conservation purpose. At the same time, the STB could
impose more substantial criteria for determining the public convenience
and necessity that goes into rail reactivation. It could also pursue more
informal avenues, such as educating railroads and interim trails users
before these parties enter into their railbanking agreements as to the
factors that the IRS will consider.
Although these agency actions may seem unlikely, and perhaps
even undesirable for the railroads, it is the public agencies that are
charged with promoting rational rules to further important legislative
policies. Consequently, these groups, rather than the private railroads,
should be initiating any changes that might help resolve the conflicts
discussed herein. It would seem particularly true that public agencies are
more likely to make regulatory decisions with an eye toward the public
interest than private corporations seeking to maximize their bottom
lines.267 Thus, it would seem eminently logical for the IRS to make rules
about the scope of the deduction before it has to litigate the issue with
irate taxpayers. But even if this is too optimistic, we hope that such a
thorough understanding of the conflict, as we have articulated in this
Article, will enable all the parties to work toward an acceptable solution.
If railroads and trail sponsors will draft better agreements, they can help
foster the important public policies behind all of these laws.
Finally, we must offer a final caveat. The correct solution is not
for the railroads and trail sponsors to enter into an agreement by which
26 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 06-10-017 (Mar. 10, 2006).
267 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REv. 1285, 1303-04 (2003). But see Abner Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 168-69
(1988).
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the railroad agrees not to exercise its right to reactivate. Such an agree-
ment undermines the rail preservation policy of the railbanking statute
by making it a mere shibboleth. If the tension between these policies and
regulations ultimately leads to the obliteration of the right to reactivate,
the legal foundation of the railbanking process will crumble. Until the laws
of the states are better formed to permit a broad shifting public use doc-
trine, which would allow the conversion of rail corridors to other public
uses, the railbanking statute is the only mechanism for preserving these
national assets. We cannot allow the Preseaults' claim that the rail preser-
vation goal is a sham to become real. If we do, we will have lost sight of
the public interest and the public character of these quasi-public spaces.
CONCLUSION
Although many people probably do not appreciate the complex legal
issues involved in recycling unused railroad corridors into recreational
trails, most would approve of using tax incentives to encourage railroads
to donate their corridors for public uses. These corridors were assembled
with extensive public aid, from eminent domain powers to state and fed-
eral gifts of land.268 Even private grantors often donated the land to the
railroads if they would locate a depot or freight-loading station nearby.269
The railroads have common carrier obligations and are federally regulated
because of their great public importance.27 ° And the NTSA amendments
that created the railbanking program have proven to be critical in preserv-
ing thousands of miles of priceless rail corridors.2"1 Trail users, municipal
governments and local parks departments, and even the railroads are com-
ing together to facilitate the dual goals of the railbanking statute: interim
trail use and rail preservation. And there are many good reasons for the
railroads to participate besides the prospect of a valuable tax deduction.
But as with many provisions in the I.R.C., tax deductions can provide a
powerful incentive for private parties to take actions that benefit the public
at large. Thus, there is a trade-off between the revenue consequences and
the public benefits that accrue from charitable giving.
26 Wright & Hester, supra note 10, at 368-72 (describing the complicated process by
which railroads assembled corridors).
269 POWELL, supra note 4, § 78A.06[1].
270 See Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., Abandonment Between St. Marys & Minister in
Auglaize County, Ohio, 9 I.C.C.2d 1015 (1993).
271 See Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, What is Railbanking?,http://www.railstotrails.org/
whatwedo/trailadvocacy/railbanking.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2008). '
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We have shown in this Article how railbanking, interim trail
use, and charitable giving policies may clash when rail-trail conversions
encounter the partial interest rule. And we have offered some partial
solutions for rationalizing the intersection of the I.R.C. and the NTSA in
the context of railbanking. In the end, however, we strongly urge the IRS,
the STB, the National Parks Service and the railroads to work together
to create a regulatory mechanism that will foster, as best it can, the dual
goals of rail preservation and interim trail use. For with each mile of
railroad corridor that is irrevocably lost, the public loses an important
transportation option, the value of which may not be fully appreciated
until it is gone. Harmonizing our laws to recognize the public aspects of
railroad corridors, to preserve them for future generations, and to respect
the private rights of landowners and railroads is no easy task. We hope
that this analysis will help move us toward a less conflicting set of trans-
portation, conservation, and economic policies that will preserve rail
corridors for future generations.
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